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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This is an inquiry into the macroeconomic implications of 
microeconomlc market power. In particular, the role of market structure 
in price and output adjustment is developed theoretically and tested 
empirically. The price and output adjustment process so modeled then 
becomes the supply side of a macro model. These explicitly micro-
based adjustment rules, derived from a dynamic profit maximizing theory 
of the firm and specified with estimates of response coefficients, act 
as additional constraints on stabilization policy makers' objective 
functions. That is to say, a full (closed economy) macro model is 
developed which depicts the interaction of the familiar Keynesian 
demand side of the economy with micro based and directly estimated 
supply side. The steady state version of this model is subjected to 
input supply shocks and optimal stabilization policy responses are 
derived. These policy responses are optimal given the objective func-
tion and the derived macroeconomic structure of the economy. Thus 
the self interested (profit maximizing) behavior of microeconomlc 
agents constrains the conduct of stabilization policy. This behavior 
parallels that of the real world. Because these policy rules are more 
realistic than those rules derived in the absence of explicitly optimiz-
ing supply side behavior, they provide additional insights for dealing 
with stagflation. 
Though the direct impetus for this study was the address by 
Klein (38), interest in the macroeconomic implications of microeconomlc 
2 
market power stems from the seminal work of Gardiner Means (44). He 
observed a tendency for prices in less atomlstlcally competitive industries 
to fall significantly less in the face of declining demand than prices 
in more competitive industries. Means' empirical judgments have been 
sharply criticized by Stigler and Kindahl (60), and others. Conse-
quently, the interim and ensuing literature has been primarily concerned 
with the empirical verification or denial of the existence of administered 
prices rather than with the underlying theoretical issues. A compre-
hensive survey has been authored by Beals (8). The most recent contri-
butions to the empirical debate are the papers by Weiss (66) and Kottke 
(39). 
The link from micro decision making to macro performance 
received new interest with the stagflation of the late 1950's in the 
studies of Schultz (54), Ackley (1), and others, e.g., (22). More 
recently, Hicks (30) and Okun (48) added a forceful new thrust to the 
argument by defining the interaction between fix-price and flex-price 
markets. These studies and Ackley's provide the intuitive framework 
for the present study, which seeks to contribute a rigorous, choice-
theoretic foundation. 
A second strand of literature, originating with the pioneer-
ing efforts of Clower (13), (14), and extended by others,— has made 
two major contributions to our foundation. First, they have identified 
the microeconomic assumptions of The General Theory and thus have 
provided a logically consistent distinction between the Keynesian 
insight and the classical system. Second, they have investigated some 
macroeconomic implications of alternative microeconomlc assumptions and 
thus have provided a logical framework for the present study. 
t 
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The works which most closely parallel this research are the 
studies of Gordon (24) and Okun (48). This paper differs from these 
in that behavioral rules for the firms are not imposed a priori notions, 
however descriptive or plausible, but instead are derived from an 
explicit dynamic profit maximizing process in which market structure 
and rival interdependence matter. In addition, the macroeconomic 
analysis herein goes beyond existing studies by using these estimated 
micro decision rules as the supply side of a full macro model. Thus, 
they automatically constrain the attainment of stabilization policy 
makers' objectives in dealing with exogenous shocks. 
In Chapter, II a theory of price and output adjustment is devel-
oped. The role of market structure in the adjustment process receives 
particular concern, and the dynamic profit maximizing decision rules 
are explicitly derived, for they are to be estimated later. The price 
ana output adjustment equations from the theory of the firm become 
the supply side of the macro model constructed in Chapter III. Chapter 
IV describes the estimation procedures and parameter derivations for 
the full macro model, while Chapter V reports the results of the 
simulated supply shocks and the derived optimal stabilization policy 
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MARKET STRUCTURE AND THE COSTS OF ADJUSTMENT 
1. Introduction 
This chapter develops a theory of the imperfectly competitive 
firm's adjustments to disequilibrium observations or unrealized expec-
tations.— Factors affecting the decision to use price, output, or 
inventories as an adjustment mechanism are outlined, and the role of 
market structure in this decision process is emphasized. A model 
incorporating the essential arguments is then specified, and dynamic 
profit maximizing responses to disequilibrium are analyzed. 
Disequilibrium exists when prevailing choice variable levels 
are no longer perceived as profit maximizing. There are two sources of 
disequilibrium: (1) product demand shifts, and (2) supply side shifts 
(e.g., changed input prices, inventory holding costs, etc.). 
The cost of disequilibrium is defined as the profit lost 
from not responding to a condition change. For example, in Figure 
2:1 let q. be the initial profit maximizing output level of a firm. 
Suppose marginal cost increases to MC2, but the firm does not increase 
its price. Then demand remains equal to output at q., and the triangle 
cba, or 
rql 
[MC2 - MR1(q)]dq , 
q2 
represents the profit foregone by not responding, i.e., the cost of 
disequilibrium. 
Disequilibrium cost in the case of demand shifts can be 





point e, and then suppose the marginal revenue schedule increases to 
MR_. If the firm does not change its price, the quantity demanded will 
increase. But the passive firm alters neither price nor quantity 
2/ 
produced, refuses to service the increased demand,— and foregoes the 
extra profit triangle 
(MR2(q) - MC1)dq . 
Thus the cost of disequilibrium, i.e., the opportunity cost of not 
responding to a change in demand or costs, is the implicit cost of 
maintaining a stable price and output policy. 
Mere recognition that demand or supply conditions have changed, 
however, does not necessarily mean it is optimal to adjust to the new 
profit maximizing equilibrium. The costs of adjustment must be compared 
to the benefits foregone or opportunity cost of disequilibrium. Barro 
(6) and Simon and Rice (55) have studied the relation between the cost 
of disequilibrium and market power, where increased market power is 
defined as decreased price responsiveness of the firm's demand curve. 
Simon and Rice's work includes the part of Barro's analysis pertinent 
to this study as a special case. Furthermore, Simon and Rice show 
that in an empirically large class of cases, the cost of disequilibrium 
decreases with increased market power. Thus for a given cost of adjust-
ment, i.e., cost of responding to disequilibrium, we may tentatively 
conclude that firms with more market power will make smaller and per-
haps less frequent adjustments. In the structure-conduct-performance 
tradition of industrial organization, the amount of operable market 
power is determined primarily by the underlying structure of market 
8 
concentration. The next three sections of this chapter develop market 
structure influences on the cost of adjusting price, output, and final 
good inventories, respectively. Finally, a model incorporating the 
combined adjustment cost effects into the firm's dynamic optimization 
problem is constructed and analyzed. 
2. Price 
Costs of changing price arise from two primary sources: (1) 
administrative necessities, internal to the firm, and (2) rivals' 
3/ reactions, external to the firm.— Administrative costs include intra-
firm decision making costs and information processing costs, both 
within the firm and between the firm and its customers. They vary 
across firms, directly and primarily with the relative importance of 
an expanded sales network in the distribution process. For example, 
the administrative costs of changing price for a single product are 
greater for an industrial chemical company that depends upon traveling 
salesmen than for a retail department store. 
The other major source of price adjustment costs stems from 
the existence of supra-normal profits in concentrated industries. 
The evidence suggesting a link between market structure and at least 
short run profits is overwhelming (see Weiss (65)). Thus this source 
of price adjustment costs is related to a series of notions in the 
literature; the kinked demand curve (Hall and Hitch (28), Sweezy (63)), 
oligopolistic discipline (Scherer (52), Ross and Wachter (51)), and 
reaction functions. These arguments can be distilled into the con-
cept of the "oligopolistic cost of changing price," OC(AP), defined 
as expected profit losses from changes in the industry price structure 
9 
and the firm's relative position within that structure. The theory 
developed below will explore the relation between this concept and 
market structure. 
Following Stigler (57), we shall assume that once inter-
dependence is recognized, the objective of all firms is to maximize 
profits through collusion. As Stigler points out, maintainance of a 
collusive agreement is no simple matter, and received theory predicts 
that most firms will find themselves in market environments where 
reasonable approximations to the competitive (non-cooperative) equi-
librium solution obtains. (See Ulen (64) for a compelling critique of 
traditional cartel theory.) For these firms, this second type of 
price adjustment cost is non-existent—they react to changed conditions 
like the perfect competitors in textbooks. 
The theory of perfectly competitive markets might be thought 
generally applicable to free market economies but for two obvious facts: 
firms recognize their interdependence, and prices do not equal marginal 
costs. But neither do most firms partcipate in explicitly malevolent 
schemes to keep prices artificially high. It should be made clear that 
overt collusion is not an assumption of the theory developed herein. 
The economic effects of widespread rule of thumb or historically based 
pricing rules are qualitatively identical to those of explicitly collusive 
pricing agreements, i.e., (1) prices do not adjust rapidly, thus resources 
may be mlsallocated in a static efficiency sense, and (2) firms have an 
incentive to consider rivals' possible reactions before changing price. 
Weston's (67) arguments suggest that resource misallocation is not a 
serious dynamic problem in a market based economy, even an imperfectly 
10 
competitive one. This is a perennial topic of economic and philosophical 
debate. But there does appear to be substantial evidence of the second 
result of both collusive agreements and familiar markup rules. It is this 
recognized incentive to "look before leaping" upon which the theory of 
oligopolistic price adjustment is built. 
Suppose there exists a joint profit maximizing pricing distri-
bution, and that each member of the industry is participating in a 
collusive profit maximizing scheme. Now let either demand expectations 
or supply conditions change for one firm; then the joint profit maximiz-
ing vector, P* = (P*,» P*2> •••»
 p* )» changes accordingly. But only 
one firm necessarily knows that P* is now different, and that firm 
facing the altered market environment has three distinct choices: 
(1) do nothing, (2) move to its new joint profit maximizing price, or 
(3) move to an individual profit maximizing price or set of prices. 
The firm's decision of whether or not to change price depends 
upon the relative magnitudes of the net benefit from changing price and 
the net cost of leaving price alone, i.e., suffering the cost of dis-
equilibrium. The net benefit from changing price is the increased 
profit from strategy (2) or (3) minus the administrative and rivalry 
induced costs of changing price. In the Barro and Simon-Rice papers, 
interflrm rivalry is ignored, and the cost of disequilibrium equals 
the profit to be gained from moving to the new joint profit maxmimlzing 
(monopoly) price. In this environment, price will be adjusted instan-
taneously if administrative costs are less than the cost of disequi-
4/ 
librium, and not at all if the converse holds.— The following analysis 
suggests that under certain conditions a non-administrative cost of 
changing price should also be included in economic analyses of the 
11 
firm's adjustment calculus. When this oligopolistic cost of changing 
price exists, it is likely to be the major component opposite the cost 
of disequilibrium on the profit maximizing scales of decision making. 
The oligopolistic cost of changing prices, OC(AP), is defined 
as Ap«(S.Jl(MS)ir* - TTCE)» where 
Ap = the increase in probability that the present-
interfirm "agreement" will breakdown due to 
a firm's price change; 
S. = the share of collusive profits accruing to the 
firm contemplating the price change; 
5,(MS) = the degree to which coordination is perfect, 
0 <. Jl(MS) <_ 1; 
MS = a market structure index, increasing with 
concentration; 
ir* = the industry's joint maximum profit level; 
TT__ * firm profits in the absence of an agreement, 
or after the breakdown of collusion (in 
competitive equilibrium) .— 
Since tr* is equivalent to pure monopoly profits, it is determined 
by overall demand and production cost conditions and is exogenous to the 
individual firm. The expression S. A(MS) ir* represents the profit 
presently earned by the j-th firm. Note that each firm's supra-competitive 
profits increase as the degree of coordination approaches perfection. 
From Stigler's positive theory (57), and from the evidence reviewed by 
Weiss (65), we accept and maintain the hypothesis that effective 
12 
coordination is an increasing function of market concentration. Thus, 
2.'(MS) > 0. It is assumed that most industries do not reach explicit 
agreements because of excessive transactions costs and fear of govern-
mental responses. Instead they rely on tacit coordination or acceptance 
of historical margins and pricing patterns, thus each S. is allocated 
according to market share. This implies that the largest firms have 
the largest oligopolistic cost of changing price, ceteris paribus.— 
Before determining market structure's effect on OC(AP), we 
must know its impact on the probability that an agreement or existing 
price structure will break down, p. This probability is assumed to be 
a function of the size of the price change, the information flows con-
cerning the nature of the demand or supply condition change that 
precipitated the change in the industry's price structure, and the sum 
across all n firms of the profit differential between coordination and 
cheating, i.e., the aggregate incentive to cheat. Thus 
n 
(2.1) p - g(|AP. - APjI.A,, Z (u - S A(MS)ir*)) , 
2 2 2 i=l 1 x 
where the symbols not previously explained represent: 
the change in the price of the j-th firm; 
the change in P. expected by other members of 
the industry as a result of "public good" 
information flows about the nature of the 
condition change; 
absolute value operator; 
announcements of the j-th firm's change in 





IT. • profit that can be earned by cheating at the margin 
by the i-th firm. 
The expression g. will be used to represent the partial derivative of 
p with respect to the i-th argument. We discuss below the reasons for 
our assumptions that g., g~ > 0, g„ < 0. 
The role of information is crucial in this concept of p, for 
it affects all three partial derivatives. The "public good" information 
that determines the value of AP. is the knowledge available to all firms 
at zero marginal acquisition cost about the event or condition change 
that caused the disequilibrium. For example, an industry-wide union 
wage settlement would convey a certain set of expectations concerning > 
interdependent rivals' price behavior. Realization of expectations 
g 
leads to no behavioral changes, i.e., when AP. = AP., 
g1(0,Aj,E(^fi - S1il(MS)ir*)) = 0 . 
Thus, we are assuming that if every firm adjusts in a predictable manner, 
the industry's coordinating discipline can be maintained. 
Expectations of rivals' price responses to current excess demand 
observations are likely to be less uniform, for excess demand observa-
tions are unlikely to be identical throughout the industry. In addition, 
firms may hold different beliefs about the variance of demand and thus 
make judgments about the permanence of demand shifts using different 
boundary criteria. Unlike the union contract announcement, the "cost-
less" information flow about demand conditions is not a public good. 
It is a different good for each firm since rivals can be excluded from 
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demand observation information. For these reasons it is likely that 
unexpected changes in price occur periodically within tacitly collusive 
industries. We assume that surprises elicit interfirm suspicion, thus 
g, > 0. Note that the price change argument of the probability function 
is specified in absolute value terms so that deviations from expecta-
tions in magnitude as well as direction increase the probability of 
agreement breakdown. 
The j-th firm's announcements, A., represent the company's 
public statements or explanations of its altered environment and price. 
Theoretically, this could be measured along a quality of announcement 
continuum, where a phone call merely notifying The Wall Street Journal 
is of lower quality and less costly to provide than an executive's press 
conference preceded by hours of research and word selection performed by 
top management.— The implicit assumption is that the firm prefers to 
maintain the industry's tacit pricing agreement. Thus it will not cheat 
in the new market environment, even though any price decision could 
always be interpreted as such. In addition, it is assumed the firm 
will not strategically lie, otherwise rivals will eventually learn to 
8/ 
discount its words.— This is a theory of adjustment in oligopolistic 
markets where interdependent rivals recognize the incentives to act in 
concert. These announcements are presumed to be somewhat effective in 
persuading rivals of the j-th firm's benign intent, thus both g~ and 
«12 K °" 
To complete the discussion of information's role in the 
probability of an agreement's breakdown, recall that in Stigler's model 
rivals formed opinions about other firms' actions by comparing their own 
15 
observed sales with expected sales. Unfulfilled sales expectations 
foster the belief that someone has made a secret price concession. 
The "knowledge" that rivals deduce from their own surprising sales 
patterns causes g- to be positive. The partial derivative g» is 
positive by the self interested assumption that an increased incentive 
to cheat will induce more cheating. This increased cheating will be 
detected as non-cheaters observe their sales declining relative to 
expectation. 
A final preliminary question concerns the effect of market 
structure on the role of announcements. Let ir** = S.£(MS)ir*; the risk 
neutral firm will maximize E(ir) = (l-p)ir** + PTTCE - C(A.), where C(A.) 
is announcement production costs. For a given 
AP , APe, and Z(ii± - S^MS)**) , 
A* satisfies 
1A^3-V** + ¥CE"C,(V = ° 
or 
(2.2) -g20r** - irCE) - C . 
Recall that g„ < 0, i.e., announcements promote stability. Equation (2.2) 
tells us that announcement quality will be increased until the expected 
benefit of the self-generated information flow, the decreased probability 
of agreement collpase times the extra profit from agreement maintenance, 
9/ is equal to the marginal cost of announcement production.— Note A* is 
optimal given a AP. decision. 
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The effect of market structure on announcements can be found 
by totally differentiating (2.2) with respect to MS. Letting ATT » n** - TTCE 
and rearranging, yields 
3A* 
(g23a'(MS)ir*Air - g2S £'(MS)Tr*) <2'3> 3MS 
g22ATT + C" 
Since it is assumed that g~ < 0, A'(MS) > 0, and that the second order 
3A* 
condition holds, -rr-L > 0 if g23 >. 0. 
g2_ >_ 0 means that an announcement's marginal ability to reduce 
the probability of an agreement's breakdown, g2 < 0, is not increased by 
an increasing incentive to cheat. If all cheating is done at the margin, 
and if only one discounted price is used per unit of time, the incentive 
to cheat is an increasing function of the quantity of sales that can be 
enticed from rivals' customers. Then g„- > 0 is equivalent to the state-
ment that an announcement's marginal credibility is a non-increasing func-
tion of rivals unexpected sales losses. This appears to be a reasonable 
3A* 
proposition, and from this assumption it follows that TTJ^ > 0. The 
result predicts that firms in concentrated industries are more likely to 
"explain" price changes than firms in less concentrated markets. In 
essence, these firms have the most to lose from agreement breakdowns; 
they are willing to devote more resources to the maintenance of the 
present cooperative environment. 
Now for the fundamental question, how is the oligopolistic 
cost of changing price affected by varying concentration levels? We 
defined OC(AP) to be AP*(S.A(MS)TT* - ir_E), which approaches 
(2.4) 8i<|Ap.j " APjI.Aj.SOfj - S±A(MS)**))•(*** - ir^) 
17 
in the limit as AP. goes to zero. Again let Air » ir** - ir ; differentia-
j Cci 
tion yields 
spew ^ , !^ i + 
3MS s12 3MS 
as 
(2.5) 
g 1 3(- E S±)l'(MS)Tr*)ATr + 
gx SJJI'(MS)TT* = 0 
3A* 
S 1 & , ( M S ) ^ > - g l 2 3MS-+8l3&'(MS)lT'* 
Air < g^ 
The proof that both sides of (2.5) are positive and the formal 
statement of the result are deferred to a note.— Intuitively, equa-
tion (2.5) does imply that the firms most likely to find the oligopolistic 
cost of changing price increasing with concentration are those with the 
largest market share, the highest marginal collusive profit, the least 
marginal announcement effectiveness, and the least marginal suspicion 
of all change induced by cheating opportunities. Thus the result 
suggests that large firms in traditionally stable industries than earn 
supra-normal profits and regularly utilize announcements will find it 
more costly to adjust price as concentration in their industry increases. 
Furthermore, (2.5) =* 9 0^ P^ ~ 0 as 
n fix fi > ~812 3MS fl3 
U , & ; Air < g;LJl'(MS)ir*
 +
 g;L ' 
Note the expression £'(MS)ir* represents marginal collusive 
profit accruing to the entire industry. Then £'(MS)ir* has a well known 
empirical counterpart, the coefficient on concentration proxies in 
18 
regressions of profit equations using industry data. Equation (2.6) 
clearly implies that as £'(MS)ir* increases, the probability that 
— a *» > 0 increases. Thus we may infer that the effect of increasing 
concentration on the oligopolistic cost of changing price is more likely 
to be positive for those industries with large marginal collusive 
profits, and especially so for the larger firms within those industries. 
This interpretation of equations (2.5) and (2.6) suggests an 
important link between the administered pricing and the concentration-
profitability branches of the industrial organization literature. 
Existing empirical work (e.g., Bain (4), (5), Stigler (58), Mann (43)) 
implies there is a large range of concentration which does not 
influence industry profitability substantially. Thus one might con-
struct a 2-(MS) function like the one in Figure 2:3. 
Below MS, £.'(MS)ir* is so low that ^ < 0, i.e., firms 
actually increase their reliance on changing price to avoid the cost 
of disequilibrium as they get increasing amounts of market power. To 
solidify this notion, imagine changing price with the knowledge that one 
is nearly perfectly competitive. The more market power one gets, the 
more insulated one is from infintely elastic demand curves and the 
quantum leaps in sales induced by changing price in textbook perfect 
competition. 
Beyond some MS • MS, interdependence is more easily recognized 
and collusion becomes more feasible. As the marginal collusive gains 
grow with dominance (i.e., where £"(MS) > 0), the cost of adjusting price 
to reconcile disequilibrium increases because the act of changing price 
increases the probability of agreement breakdown and the resulting 
19 
FIGURE 3 : 1 
Jl(MS) 
> MS 
MS MS* MS. MAX 
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expected profit loss is larger. Thus increasing concentration increases 
A 
the oligopolistic cost of changing price beyond MS. 
Of course, A(MS) could have an inflection point, MS*, beyond 
which the marginal collusive gains from increased concentration decline. 
A(l- N *^* 
Note that .̂ ,p' » -g2 - ^ + g3«.'(MS)ir* > 0, i.e., as concentration 
increases, the probability of cooperative stability, (1-p), increases. 
Thus as an industry approaches pure monopoly, increased reliance on 
price as an adjustment instrument could become rational again. This 
would occur if agreement stability were virtually assured by the high 
concentration, but the marginal profit gained by increased concentration 
(and risked by changing price) was very small. In this range of MS > MS*, 
all events are interpreted in the context of the overriding need and recognized 
gains from mutual cooperation. In his debunking of the kinked demand 
curve, Stigler (59) pointed out that a pure monopolist should fear no 
repercussions from changing price as often as market conditions might 
dictate. 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to estimate a J!, (MS) func-
tion, though that certainly is a direction of future research suggested 
by the analysis. The present concern is with the use of price as an 
adjustment instrument, and the analysis suggests that market structure 
could influence that choice in some ranges. Thus MS should be included 
as an explanatory variable in any empirical estimation of the determinants 
of price changes. 
Prices will be stable if the cost of changing them exceeds 
the cost of not doing so. As mentioned above, preliminary work on the 
cost of disequilibrium by Simon and Rice suggest that in an empirically 
21 
large class of cases increased market power decreases the cost of not 
changing price. Thus for the same cost of changing price, firms in 
more concentrated markets will change price less for a given distribution 
of disequilibrium observations. 
The theory developed herein suggests there are ranges of MS 
with higher OC(AP) than others. In these high OC(AP) ranges, increas-
ing concentration will lead to two reinforcing effects tending to 
promote price stability, decreased cost of disequilibrium and increased 
oligopolistic cost of changing price. In other ranges of MS, the two 
effects are offsetting, and thus the result is unpredictable a priori. 
Estimating these separate effects are also tasks of future empirical 
inquiries. 
In closing this section, we note that this theory of oligopolistic 
price adjustment helps explain the disparity in empirical results attempt-
ing to relate administered prices to levels of concentration and other 
measures of market power. First, equation (2.5) states that for different 
size firms, increased concentration will have different effects on the 
oligopolistic cost of changing prices, and that larger firms are more 
likely to find this effect positive. Therefore empirical tests of the 
administered price hypothesis using industry price data are impaired by 
aggregation bias. Second, and perhaps even more crucially, the possi-
bility that £"(MS) is positive, zero, and negative over the relevant 
range of concentration implies that empirical inquiries into administered 
price phenomena should not implicitly assume that concentration has a 
monotonic impact on the incentives to use price as an adjustment mechanism. 
Rather, it would seem empirical research should concentrate on (a) finding 
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the common characteristics of industries that actually do practice 
stable price behavior; and (b) analyzing the impact of these industries 
on the remainder of the economy. This thesis is a first step toward 
providing a theoretical foundation for that inquiry. 
3. Output 
On first thought, the costs of adjusting output levels would 
seem to be wholly dependent upon technical production and input market 
conditions facing the firm. But three independent arguments have been 
developed which suggest that periodic excess capacity is profit maxi-
mizing under certain conditions. This excess capacity, and the concomitant 
costs of adjusting the rate of capacity utilization, turn out to affect 
the costs of adjusting output in ways potentially related to market 
structure. 
First, Nadiri and Rosen (45) and more explicitly, Airaksenen 
(2) show that an increasing marginal flow price of capital services 
(e.g., increased maintenance costs, accelerated depreciation, etc.) is 
a sufficient condition for a firm to maintain excess capacity. In addi-
tion, Winston and McCoy (70) find that rhythmic variation of some input 
prices make it profitable to overbuild capital stock in order to produce 
output during periods of low variable input costs and reduce operations 
during periods of high costs. 
In the work most relevant to the present study, Spence (56) 
has linked oligopoly theory and excess capacity through his analysis of 
entry prevention. Essentially his idea is that the cooperative members 
of an industry may choose their individual capacity levels subject to 
an additional constraint that entry remain unprofitable. The existence 
23 
of excess capacity causes potential entrants to evaluate profit oppor-
tunities at prices consistent with full capacity utilization by exist-
ing firms. Thus entry is deterred, prices and profits for existing 
firms can remain at supra-competitive levels, but the carrying cost of 
the extra capacity keeps profits below levels that would be attainable 
in the absence of entry threats. 
A straightforward extension of Spence*s analysis, detailed 
in Appendix I, shows that when capacity is used as a barrier to entry, 
the optimal capital stock decreases with increased market power, i.e., 
3K 
•rrjg- < 0. This mildly surprising result merits discussion. 
The existence of an entry threat makes Spence's entry-deterring 
excess capacity constraint operable. Therefore more capacity than is 
consistent with simple profit maximization will be maintained. The 
3K 
result TTJT < 0 says that this excess capacity decreases as market power 
increases. The economic rationale is clear if firms are less willing to 
enter concentrated industries than less concentrated ones. In effect the 
market structure itself becomes a barrier to entry. Potential entrants 
that want to be more than "fringe" firms are less likely to risk incurring 
the wrath of a few giant firms than to take their chances entering 
industries with more equal sized competitors. 
This proposition is not as counter-intuitive as it may appear. 
What is relevant to entry decisions is post-entry profits, not the pre-
entry profit levels of existing firms. While it is axiomatic that 
resources controlled by profit maximizers will flow to uses which yield 
the highest expected return, it does not follow that an industry is a 
preferred entry target just because the average rate of return of 
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existing firms is higher than apparent alternatives. Firms earning the 
most supra-competitive profit have the greatest incentive to respond 
vigorously to any entry which threatens that profit. This credible 
retaliation threat could lower expected post-entry profits until another 
industry, with a lower average rate of return but less concentration 
and thus less mutual interdependence recognition, becomes a more 
attractive entry target. 
Obviously the notion that excess capacity declines with market 
power because concentration itself serves as an entry barrier is a 
testable and refutable proposition.—But not only does it follow 
directly from Spence's analysis of oligopolistic investment, it is also 
consistent with the empirical results of Esposito and Esposito (19), the 
only study to date of excess capacity and market structure at the 4-digit 
SIC level. They found that partial oligopolies have more excess capacity 
than both atomistically competitive industries and tight oligopolies. 
Thus we maintain the hypothesis that excess capacity decreases with market 
concentration in those ranges of concentration where capacity is used as 
a barrier to entry. In what follows we observe how this assumption 
affects the theoretical analysis of output adjustment, and in a later 
chapter, we test for some implications of the effect in empirical formu-
lations of the theory. 
We are interested in the effect, and the conditions under which 
there will be an effect, of market structure on the costs of adjusting 
output, ceteris paribus. Let X(t) * output at time t, L(t) - labor units, 
Z(t) * rate of capacity utilization, K(t) • capital stock, W(t) - money 
wage rate, R(t) • price of physical units of capital, and 6 * depreciation 
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rate (constant). Output is a function of labor and capital service flows, 
i.e., X(t) - f(L(t),Z(t)K(t)). Taking the inverse yields the labor 
requirements function L(t) - g(X(t),Z(t)K(t)), thus we may formulate 
the firm's dynamic cost minimization problem as 
.T 
I e~rt[wg(X,ZK) + RSZK + A(K;R) + S(Z)]dt 
where: A(K;R) = adjustment costs of changing the level of the 
capital stock. This includes the purchase 
price of investment goods. 
S(Z) = setup and labor adjustment costs associated 
with changing the rate of capacity utilization. 
A,, A.,, S*, and S" are all > 0. 
(The time subscripts have been omitted for notational ease.) 
Minimizing subject to a given path of X(t) is equivalent to 
minimizing production plus adjustment costs over the time horizon. 
Then if we assume production costs of the firm are independent of the 
industry's market structure, e.g., if there are constant returns to 
12/ 3J 
scale.— the conditions under which -rr̂r T4 0 are the conditions under oM5 
which market structure affects the costs of adjusting output levels. 
To formulate the problem more conveniently for our analytics, 
we define I » K + <5ZK and U = Z and rewrite the cost function as 
T 
J = I e"rt[wg(X,ZK) + A(I;R) + S(U)]dt . 
U 0 
3 1 . 
3J 
Noting that -rx • 6Z, we find that the marginal effect of concentration 
oe"
rt{(wg2 + A 16)Z^}dt. on costs is (A) 3 M g 
It is clear from equation (A) that market structure must 
3K 
3MS affect the optimal level of the capital stock, i.e., -rrjr must be non-zero, 
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t 
for there to be any effect of increased concentration on output adjust-
ment costs. An extension of Spence's work which is presented in Appendix 
I demonstrates that increased concentration decreases excess capacity 
when capacity is used to deter entry. In the range of concentration in 
3K 3J 
which this occurs, Trjr < 0 and the sign of -rrrg- is opposite that of 
3K 
wg2 + A.<5. Thus we take rrjr < 0 as a necessary condition for increased 
concentration to lower output adjustment costs, and note this leads to 
the following contingent results: 
A 
3J 
(1) with no adjustment costs in K and Z, -grjjr = 0; 
(2) with adjustment costs in K only and Z* < 1, -rrjr- » 0; 
A 
3J 
(3) with adjustment costs in K and Z, -rrjr- < 0, regard-
less of the level of excess capacity; 
A 
3J 
(4) with adjustment costs in Z only, -rrjr- < 0 regard-
less of the level of excess capacity. 
As a whole, the results suggest an additional necessary condition for 
increased concentration to lower output adjustment costs, the existence 
of adjustment costs in the rate of capacity utilization (internal adjust-
ment costs). Because these results are all derived in the same way, only 
the final derivation is presented in Appendix II. 
The first result alone merits no discussion since it derives 
from a case in which the cost of changing output levels is zero, as 
with the textbook neoclassical firm. The second case illustrates why 
the existence of interval adjustment costs is a necessary condition. 
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Since excess capacity is presumed to exist when capacity is used as a 
3K 
barrier to entry, i.e., when Tw<r < 0, zero interval adjustment costs 
imply that it is costless to change output (at least over a certain 
range). Increased concentration can never lower output adjustment 
costs below zero. 
Result (3) is consistent with the plausible idea that adjust-
ing output by varying the rate of capacity utilization is cheaper than 
adjusting output by varying the capital stock that is always fully 
utilized. In this case the excess capacity choice concomitant with 
entry deterrence affords the firm the luxury of varying output by chang-
ing capacity utilization rates. 
The final result implies that the two necessary conditions 
A 
3J 
together are sufficient to guarantee -rrrr > 0. Thus we conclude that 
increased concentration will lower output adjustment costs if capacity 
is used as a barrier to entry and if capacity utilization (internal 
adjustment) costs are present. 
The economic intuition consistent with this conclusion is 
similar to that discussed with result (3) above. It is less expensive 
to adjust output by varying the rate of capacity utilization than by 
varying the capital stock. If this were false, excess capacity would 
not be the least cost method of preventing entry. Result (4) is 
stronger than result (3) because it states that even if the only cost 
of adding capital stock is the purchase price, i.e., even if external 
adjustment costs are zero, it is still cheaper to adjust output by 
varying capacity utilization rates. Therefore the excess capacity 
necessary for entry prevention lowers output adjustment costs by 
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allowing the firm to adjust its capacity utilization rate in both direc-
tions from the original long run equilibrium (entry deterring) position. 
Of course, nothing guarantees that capacity will be a barrier 
to entry (which implies that output adjustment costs could decrease with 
concentration) in the same ranges of concentration with high marginal 
collusive profit (which implies that the oligopolistic cost of changing 
price increases with concentration). Therefore we may not conclude that 
market structure necessarily has symmetric and opposite effects on the 
costs of adjusting price and output. Any thorough development of market 
structure related equilibrium adjustment theory must consider the role 
of inventories. This role is examined in the next section. 
4. Inventories 
The presence of demand uncertainty creates the incentive to 
hold final good inventories as insurance against stockouts. Given the 
anonymity inherent in perfectly competitive markets, i.e., large numbers 
of homogeneous buyers and sellers, decreased future sales from present 
stockouts must be minimal. Customers enter the market in effect with 
no memory, merely seeking the lowest price in each period. We may then 
infer that a firm must have some market power, i.e., face a downward-
sloping demand curve, before future sales could be lost from present 
stockouts or backlog delays. 
From this idea we could derive a simple relation between market 
power and the level of inventories. But there is another potential 
impact of market structure on desired inventory levels. Stocks of 
inventories could perform the same function as excess capacity, namely, 
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deterring entry by threatening potential entrants with lower prices 
than currently prevail. Then the arguments advanced in the output 
section above, which suggested that increased concentration lowers 
excess capacity, apply as well to concentration's impact on inventories. 
Thus the relation between inventories and market structure is quite 
complex and deserves more attention than we can afford in this thesis. 
Furthermore, we are attempting to develop a theory of adjust-
ment to disequilibrium observations most relevant for our purposes is 
the relation between the cost of changing inventory levels and market 
structure. Even without the entry deterrence complication, this rela-
tion is not predictable, a priori. Therefore, for purposes of this 
study, we assume the only role of inventory is that of a buffer stock, 
i.e., inventory is a means of coping efficiently with moderately unrealized 
expectations. In our formal model there are no costs of changing inventory 
levels—inventories are expected to fluctuate constantly and signal 
changes in demand. Casual empiricism suggests this is a reasonable 
first approximation to the inventory policies of many firms. 
5. The Model 
The framework for incorporating the arguments developed in 
this thesis is a dynamic version of the model used by Nevins (46) and 
Zabel (72). This model is adapted to include appropriate adjustment 
13/ 
cost functions. The model— is specified in a discrete time dynamic 
programming framework using the following notation: 
e * additive random variable of demand, e ̂  f(e), E(e) - 0 
a. • demand • Xfc(P ) + e 
I 
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P • price of output 
Q • production in period t 
V » level of finished good inventory at the end of 
period t-1 and at the beginning of period t 
Y - Q + V • goods on hand to sell in period t 
C(Qt) • production costs 
Z. - change in the rate of capacity utilization, 
Zt+1 "
 Zt + Zt 
I • investment in capital goods 
5 => rate of depreciation (constant) 
P = change in price at the end of period t, 
P = P + P rt+l *t + *t 
Z — P — K 
A (Z),A (P),A (I) = adjustment cost functions 
MS = market structure index, exogenous to the firm 
Q. - change in production levels decided at the 
end of period t 
0 — Z — K 
AV(Q ) " A (Z ) + A (I ) « output adjustment cost function 
h(Vfc)
 a inventory cost function, h' > 0 
b = cost of stockouts = discounted future sales losses 
r = the firm's rate of time discount, R * T T -
It is assumed that the random disturbances of demand, the e's, are 
distributed identically in each period and are uncorrelated over time. 
Since the firm desires to maximize profits over a finite time horizon, 
the fundamental recurrence relation is 
(2.7) J?(Y t ,P t) -_MAX [ t M W + e) -
' t Pt,Qt
 J0 t t t 
MY,. - (X t (Pj + e))]f(s)de + PfcY. f f(e)de -
t t c c ivxt ( pt ) 
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00 
e - Yt)F(e)de - C(Yt - Vt) -
AQ(Qt;MSt) - A
P(Pt;MSt) + R J* + 1 t t* + 1 ,P* + 1 ) ] 
where 
fY t+l"X t+l ( P t+ P t ) -
JtVYr>i>pki>' «pt + VWpt + V + e> -
0 
h(Y t + 1 - (X t + 1(P t + P t) + e))]f(e)de + 
+ (P + P )Y [ _ f (e)de -
J y t + rW
p t + p t> 
.CO _ 
b- _ <x«.+i<pi- + V + E " Y.+ 1)f(e)de -
J Y t + r
X t + l
( P t + P t> 
c<Yt+i - W -
 AQ(Qt+2 - «t
 + V*W ~ 
A p ( P t + 2 " <ft + V'ffltH) * 
Following Karlin and Carr (37), Nevins (46), and Zabel (72), 
the analysis is conducted as if price and output decisions are made 
sequentially. This procedure is followed to enhance the analytic 
tractabllity of the model; the solution values are unaffected by this 
assumption and are identical to those obtaining when simultaneous price 
and output decisions are assumed. Thus in what follows, each Q* is 
determined given a P.., and then P* is determined given Q*. 
From (2.7), 
3J* n 3J* , 




Define y = Y t + 1 - Xt+1(Pt + P £); then Q* satisfies^ 
dJt 0 r 
(2.8) -^- - A?(R-1) + R[(Ph + P J f(e)de + 
Qt
 JY 
b I f(e)de - I h'(Y-e)f(e)de -
JY Jo 
(Pt + Pt)Yt+1 F(Y) - C ] - 0 . 
The effect of market structure on Q* can be found by differentiating 
(2.8) with respect to MS, which yields 
3Q* (R-l)A?. (2'9) ^-—^f 
where ]i— is the second order (uniqueness^, condition for Q* and is 
* 3Q* 
strictly negative by assumption. Thus -rrr^ has the same sign as its 
numerator. 
1 -r Q 
Recall R = TTT» thus R-l - TTT* A? 2 is the expression for 
the effect that changing market structure has on marginal output adjust-
ment costs. It follows from the results derived in Appendix II and 
discussed above in the output section that A./- < 0 if there are internal 
(capacity utilization) adjustment costs and if capacity is used as a 
barrier to entry. Therefore equation (2.9) tells us that increasing 
concentration increases the magnitude of the optimal change in output, 
ceteris paribus, when capacity is used as a barrier to entry and 
internal adjustment costs are present. If either of the two condi-
tions necessary for market structure to affect output adjustment costs 
Q 3Qt are not satisfied, A?_ " 0 and -rrrr - 0 as well. 
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Further consideration of (2.8) reveals that Q* is also affected 
r 
by the expected probability of a stockout next period f(e)de, 
fY - JY 
expected marginal inventory costs h'(y-e)f(e)de, the expected levels J° 
of demand and marginal cost, and the change in price decided on, P*. If 
.00 
we let ir. ,, = f(e)de • the expected probability of a stockout next 
Y 
period, h'.. • expected marginal inventory costs, X..- = expected demand, 
MC®,. • expected marginal production costs, and Pfc " the change in price 
decision, we may write: 
(2.10) Qt - Q(Xt+1»\+l'
MCt+l'ht+l'MS»Pt) * 
Comparative dynamic analysis detailed in Appendix III predicts that Q,, 
Q 2 > 0, Q«, Q,, and Q, < 0, while Q, depends on the effect of concentra-
tion on output adjustment costs.' Versions of (2.10) are estimated and 
incorporated into the full macro model in the chapters which follow. 
9J* p 3J*+1 
Similar procedures allow us to find - 3 - = -A.. + R ———, or 
3Pt 3Pt 
3Jt P fY -
(2.11) - ^ = (R-l)Aj + R[j (Pt + Pt)x;+1(Pt + Pt)f (e)de 
t r00 
+ J (Xt+1(Pt + Pt) + e)f (e)de + Yfc+1 J f(e)de 
+ J h'(Y-e)X^+1f(e)de - b J X' + 1 f(e)de] . 
0 Y 
Noting that X£+1(Pt + Pfc) and P +1 • P~t + Pt are independent of e, we know 
P* s a t i s f i e s 
(2.12) 
3J* 
3 P t " 
Xt+1 
(R-1)AP 
- j i - + 
f f(e)de 
' Y 











(X t + 1 + e)f(e)d£ 
Xt+1 
[ f(e)de - 0 . 
JY 
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Differentiating (2.11) or (2.12) with respect to MS yields 
(2.13) 
3P; ^ > A 1 2 
3MS -Mp 
32J* 
where û r is the second order condition, — 5 — < 0. From the section on 
* 3P£ 
price adjustment, we know 
AP <=^ 90C(AP) > Q A12 3MS < U 
as 
3A* 
S. &'(MS)ir* > -g 1 2 -^ + g13 £.'(MS)TT* 
AIT < g1 
That is, the effect of increasing concentration on price adjustment costs 
is more likely to be positive for large firms in industries with high 
marginal collusive profit. Equation (2.13) states that when price 
adjustment costs are increased by increased concentration, the dynamic 
profit maximizing price response to any exogenous shock is diminished. 
If concentration has no marginal effect on price adjustment costs, i.e., 
3P* 
if A 1 2 = 0, then ^ | = 0 . 
Returning to (2.12), we note that the sum 
fY <Xt+l + e ) f< e> d £ + Yt+1 I 
Y 
J (Xt+  e) (e)de + Yt+1 J f(e)de 
is equal to total expected sales, thus the first three bracketed terms 
together comprise expected marginal revenue, MRf... As before, 
fY e 
h'(Y-e)f(e)de = h'.. - expected marginal inventory cost, while 
.00 
b f(e)de represents expected losses from stockouts. Using these 
JY 
observations we may write 
(2.13) Pt - P(X^+1, i^+1, MR«+1, h j j r MS, Qt) . 
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The comparative dynamics of (2.12), detailed in Appendix III, predict 
P., P2, P3 > 0, P., P, < 0, and P. is determined by market structure's 
impact on price adjustment costs. Versions of (2.13) and (2.10) are 
estimated and represent the supply side of the full macro model developed 
in later chapters. 
6. Summary 
This chapter has developed some ideas relating the costs of 
disequilibrium adjustment to market structure. It was found that price 
is a relatively expensive disequilibrium mechanism for firms in industries 
with high marginal collusive profit, especially for the larger firms. 
This result suggests a link between the administered pricing and the 
concentration-profitability branches of the industrial organization 
literature. Furthermore it implies that the debate over the existence 
of administered prices cannot be settled empirically using industry data, 
and that the presumption of monotonic effects of market structure on firm 
behavior may be inappropriate. 
Firms which face internal adjustment costs and have enough 
market power to use capacity as an entry deterrent will find output 
relatively inexpensive to adjust. Finally, a formal dynamic optimiza-
tion model was specified and some properties were discussed. Market 
structure was shown to affect price and output adjustment decisions 
to the degree it affected price and output adjustment costs. Our theory 
identified distinct sets of conditions consistent with alternative 
empirical estimates of market structure's impact and thus has enhanced 
our understanding of any observed result. 
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NOTES 
— The working definition of a disequilibrium observation adopted for 
this paper is as follows: the observation of a variable's devia-
tion from its long run seasonally adjusted equilibrium that is 
not considered transient or merely due to random noise. Thus 
fully anticipated cyclical fluctuations and minor surprises 
do not lead the firm to judge that it is in disequilibrium. On 
the other hand, the firm is perfectly free to make the judgment 
that it is in disequilibrium based on short run observations. 
It all depends on the observed deviations from expected values 
and the subjective variance criteria used by the firm to formulate 
judgments of this sort. 
2/ 
— Refusal to service the increased demand necessitates rationing. 
We assume the firm is indifferent toward the rationing scheme 
self-imposed by consumers. 
3/ 
— Throughout the analysis of the costs of changing price, the simplify-
ing assumption of no entry threats is maintained. Entry will be 
considered later under output adjustment. 
4/ 
— This can be understood by reconsidering Figure 2:1. The profit 
from doing nothing different after the cost increase is 
Cq2 
(MRX - MC2)dq - cba. 
ql 
(MR.(q) - MCjdq 
0 *• * 0 f*2 Profit after changing price is "(MR1 - MC«)dq - the administrative 
costs of changing price. Thus the price change is profitable if 
administrative costs are less than the area cba, the cost of 
disequilibrium. 
— Ulen (64) has pointed out this ITC_ need not be the competitive 
(non-cooperative) equilibrium level, for if firms were rational 
enough to see the benefits of an initial agreement, might they 
not be rational enough to utilize a mechanism preventing complete 
degeneration to a Cournot-Nash type equilibrium? At any rate, 
we shall assume irc„ is exogenous to the firm's present choices. 
— Throughout this study we deal with total profit maximlzers only. 
The results we derive could hold for profit-per-unit maximlzers 
as well, but we are not yet certain. 
— Admittedly this A. cannot be precisely measured empirically. But 
we do not need toJestimate p, of which A. is an argument. A. is 
introduced explicitly only because it represents an important part 
of the tacit collusion process, and because mathematical manipulation 
37 
of the p function so specified provides insight into the price adjust-
ment decision. In fact, the result to be derived shows that market 
structure subsumes the effect of the unmeasurable A. and thus we 
may use MS in empirical work to capture any effect A. might have. 
8/ 
— By adopting a state of the world approach to the analysis of price 
adjustment costs, we are simplifying away from the fact that in a 
dynamic context, time will pass before rivals know and respond. 
Thus retaliation lag could make strategic cheating and lying 
profitable even if competitive profits were earned at the end of 
the horizon. We are attempting to gain insight into the price adjust-
ment decision beyond what is presently known. Further embellish-
ments await a later study. 
-This A* is unique if 32E(ir)/3A2 < 0, i.e., if (B) g22(
Tr
CE - ir**) - C" < 0 
Since Jir** > irCE by assumption^ g„2 j> 0 and c" >̂  0 together comprise 
a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of A* if at least one 
strict inequality holds. Economically, equation (3) says non-
increasing returns to announcement quality and non-decreasing 
marginal announcement quality production costs guarantee the 
uniqueness of A* (if at least one holds strictly). 
— The LHS is positive by the assumption that the degree of collusion 
possible is an increasing function of market concentration, i.e., 
Jl'(MS) > 0. 
The assumption that announcements assuage rivals' suspicions of 
a given price change guarantee that %.„ £ 0. g .̂ 0 by logic 
similar to that advanced for g„, >, 0> An increased incentive to 
cheat is equivalent to larger unexpected sales losses in the event 
of a cheat. Greater vulnerability to surprise leads to greater 
suspicion of any move. Thus both terms on the RHS of (2.5) are 
positive. 
Formally, equation (2.5) states that the oligopolistic cost of chang-
ing price increases with market concentration if the marginal collu-
sive profit accruing to the firm as a percentage of potential economic 
profit exceeds the announcement induced percentage slowdown in the 
increase of the probability of agreement breakdown from a given price 
change times the marginal announcement quality plus the percentage 
increase in the probability of a breakdown due to an increased 
incentive to cheat times the marginal collusive profit accruing to 
the entire industry. 
— F o r example, one may find Spence's argument unconvincing if one 
believes that the carrying costs of excess capacity ordinarily 
exceed the supra-competitive profits available. This issue can 
be settled only with empirical work. 
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— W e implicitly assume that all firms actually face an L-shaped LRATC 
function, and that the firm under study is in the horizontal portion 
of this cost curve. 
13/ 
—Zabel (73) has shown that while uniqueness can be guaranteed in 
this type of model if demand disturbances are additive, similar 
results do not hold with multiplicative uncertainty. Therefore 
this study will deal with additive uncertainty only; the work is 
conceived as a first step toward modelling the firm in dynamic 
and uncertain markets where firm interdependence matters. 
14/ 
— We are implicitly assuming that market structure is time-invariant 
over short periods, i.e., MS * MS .., and that marginal output adjust-
ment costs are constant, i.e., Ar-- = 0. The first assumption is 
consistent with most industries experiences and the two assump-
tions together imply that 
-Aj(Qfc, MSt) + R Aj(Qt+2 - (Qt + Q t); MSt+1) = (R-I)AJ. 
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CHAPTER III 
INTEGRATING THE THEORY OF THE FIRM'S ADJUSTMENT INTO A MACRO MODEL 
1. Introduction 
In Chapter II we developed a model of the firm's price and 
output adjustment processes and we derived decision rules that maximize 
a discounted expected profit stream. In this chapter these decision 
rules are assumed to describe supply side behavior in a macro model. A 
complete macro model with this micro-based supply side is shown to be 
capable of generating simultaneously increasing unemployment and infla-
tion from the types of exogenous shocks that plagued economics in the 
seventies. Thus this model explores behavioral responses that lead to 
shifts in the so called "Phillips curve" relation. Therefore this 
model is appropriate for the derivation of stabilization policy responses 
to stagflation in the chapters which follow. 
2. The Supply Side 
A. Price and Output of the Consumption and Capital Goods 
Our model has three final goods; a consumption good, a capital 
good, and energy. The market for each good is treated as a sector of 
the economy. The behavior of both the consumption good and the capital 
good sectors is based on the dynamic theory of the firm developed in 
Chapter II. The price and output of energy is determined in a flex-
price market, first defined by Hicks (30). Since most of the energy 
produced in the economy serves as an input into the productive process 
rather than as consumption in final demand, it is more appropriate to 
describe this market in detail with other inputs in Section 2.C below. 
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The general form of the profit maximizing output adjustment 
rule that was derived in Chapter II and that is applicable to both the 
consumption and capital good sectors is 




+1, MC^+1, h'^, MS, Pt) , 
where Q =* Q . - Q • change in output, decided at the end of period t, 
X®+1 = expected demand in period t+1, IT®+1 -
 u(Vt+l' Xt+1' ae) = expected 
probability of a stockout in period t+1, ir. < 0, ir2 3 > 0, V .. •» V + Q 
- X - inventory on hand at the beginning of period t+1 and thus available 
for sale during period t+1, X =» demand observed in period t (before Q 
and P decisions are made). 
2 
a - variance of demand (assumed time invariant) 
MC ,. = expected marginal production cost 
h' ,. = expected marginal inventory cost 
MS * market structure 
P • Pt+. - Pfc = change in price, a decision variable. 
Recall that the comparative dynamic analysis of Chapter II, detailed in 
Appendix III, predicted that output changes respond positively to 
expected demand and to the expected probability of a stockout, i.e., Q., 
Q2 > 0. Increasing marginal production and inventory costs decrease 
profit maximizing output adjustments, as do price increases, thus Q3, 
Q, and Q6 are all less than zero. If greater concentration lowers output 
adjustment costs, then increasing concentration will increase the inter-
period change in output. Thus our theory predicts Q, > 0 if excess 
capacity is used as a barrier to entry and if internal adjustment costs 
are present, otherwise Q_ • 0. 
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For purposes of this analysis we assume that the opportunity 
carrying cost is the dominant element of marginal inventory cost so 
that h'?. can be approximated by the expected market interest rate, 
r^,.. To make the specification of Q operational, we must specify 
explicit expectation formation processes. The simplest expectation 
assumption, hereafter called myopic, is that the expected value of a 
variable in the next period is equal to the observed value in this 
period, i.e., Z6,. = Z . This assumption transforms (3.1) into 
(3.2M) Qt = f
M(Xt, Vt+1, a
2, MCt, rt> MS, P,.) . 
From the comparative dynamics above and our assumptions about the 
effects of inventories, demand, and demand variance on the probability 
M M M M M M 
of a stockout, it follows that f", fj > 0; f£, fjr, f̂ , f" < 0; and 
The traditional adaptive expectations hypothesis, i.e., 
Zt+1 = Zt + *<Zt * Zt> > 
implies— 
(3.2A) Qt - f
A(Xt, Vt+1, a
2, MC,., rfc, MS, Pt, Qt_1) . 
The estimated coefficients of (3.2A) are products of the partial deriva-
tions fy and the speeds of adjustment. 
The profit maximizing price adjustment rule of equation (2.13) 
that was described in Chapter II is 
(3.3) Pt - P(X
e
+1, ^ , MR^+1, h'* r MS, Qt) , 
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where the only term not previously explained is MR®,- = expected marginal 
revenue. Using the fact that MR » P(l - —) where n • price elasticity 
of demand, we note that myopic expectations imply 
(3.4M) Pt «= g
M(Xt, V t + 1, a
2, Pt (1 - ~ - ) , rt, MS, Qt) , 
and adaptive expectations imply 
(3.4A) Pt = g
A(Xt, V t + 1, a
2, Pt (1 - ^ ) , rt, MS, Qt, P ^ ) . 
Our theory predicts g-, g, > 0, g2, g3, g5, g7 < 0, and g
m depends on the 
effect of market structure on the oligopolistic cost of changing price. 
A m As in the case of the output adjustment function, g. = g. times the 
speed of expectation adjustment. 
The generality of the derived price and output adjustment 
rules can be seen by considering an exogenous increase in product demand, 
Xt. Differentiating (3.8M), we find 
dP 
t _ m . m /<:m , ̂ m nu _ m .. . em mN , m ^m 
— = h + g7 (fx + f7 8 l) - gx (1 + f? g?) + g7 fx . 
Recall that gm, fm < 0 and that gm, fm > 0. Thus the positive effect 
that increases in demand have on profit maximizing price changes, 
g?(l + fm g m), is tempered by the output response to that same increase 
in demand, gm fm. The fix-price firm of standard Keynesian theory that 
does not change in price in response to demand is one for which 
dP* 
-2 m fm - em(l + fm em) => — - - 0 . 87 rl 8 1 U r7 ZV dX u * 
This does not imply that prices never change in the Keynesian formula-
tion, merely that the price change is not affected by changes in the 
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level of demand. Pure Walrasian disequilibrium adjustment may be 
described by the case in which both fm and f. are zero, while pure 
dQ 
Marshallian adjustment implies gm « g? » 0 and -jsr- • fm. 
Equations (3.2) and (3.4) are first order conditions to the 
firm's dynamic profit maximizing problem and thus they are structural 
equations of a simultaneous system. Methods and results of their esti-
mation under both expectation hypotheses are reported in Chapter IV. In 
Chapter IV we also describe the procedure used to convert the estimated 
coefficients into yearly adjustment elasticities, the or and the 3̂  below. 
The model uses the following notation: 
K => output of the capital good 
P = price of the capital good 
X = real demand for the capital good 
v = inventory of the capital good 
r - nominal interest rate 
MC = marginal production cost of the capital good 
V 
MS » market structure of the capital good sector 
2 
o * demand variance in the capital good sector 
eK 
3 " Kt-1 
P ^ - PK , t t -1 
C » output of tl\e consumption good 
Q 
P * price of the consumption good 
C X * real demand for the consumption good 
Q 
V • inventory of the consumption good 
r 
MC » marginal production cost of the consumption good 
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n 
MS • market structure of the consumption good sector 
2 
a » demand variance in the consumption good sector 
eC 
CL - C , 
t t-1 
PCL - PC rt rt-l 
W • money wage rate 
Pj • consumer price index 
U = unemployment rate 
RM 
P - price of the raw material 
~S RM a raw material supply 
P = raw material parity term 
E 
P = price of energy 
E = energy supply 
~~E 
P » energy parity term 
Y = national income or GNP 
Q 
E =» final consumer demand for energy 
YR =» real GNP 
M * money supply 
All starred variables represent long run equilibrium values. A dot over 
any variable signifies an instantaneous, proportional rate of change, 
. • dlnZ 
i.e., z - d(; . 
Specifying rates of change versions of (3.2) and (3.4) as 
reduced forms of the simultaneous difference equation system they 
represent yields the first four equations of our macro model: 
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(3.5) Kt+1 - ajtf* - X**) + o^(Kt - K*) + ajtfj - V**) 
+ c£(r t - r*) + c£(MC
K - MCK*) + a*(MSK - MSK*) 
* c ^ p f - PK*) + K* 
(3.6) p£+1 = B*(i* - X**) + B*(*t " K*) + 6 3 ^ " ***> 
+ S^fr,. - r*) + ^(Mc" - MCK*) + Bj(AK - MSK*) 
+ ( ^ - 4f) + £(** - P
K*) + BJ(|J - K*) 
+ 6*0(pf - P
K*> + PK* 
(3.7) C t+1 - cJ(X= - i
C*> + a=(Ot - C«) + ««(*« - V
C*) 
+ aj(r - r*) + Og(Mc£ - MCC*) + a°(MSC - MSC*> 
• J>& - £ > + 4(»« - P
C*> • a°(c£ - C*) 
c c 
+ aJQ(pf - P
C*) + C* 
(3.8) ?Ct+1 » 8J<*£ - X
C*) + tP2itt - C*) + 3 ^ - V
C*) 
+ fij(rt - r*) + gJ(MBJ - MC
C*) + B°(MSC - MSC*) 
+ 3°(c2 - a2*) + 3<J(PC . ^ + $c(fiL _ ^ 
c c 
+ eJ0(pf - P
C*) + c* 
To convert the general model to a first order system, we use the identities 
(3.9) throught (3.12) 
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(3.9) kLt+1 - Kt 
(3.10) P ^ - $1 
(3.11) P^+1 - Ct 
(3.12) P £ L » p£ 
Under myopic expectations, a » B = 0 for 1 » K, C, j * 9, 10, and 
(3.9) through (3.12) drop out. 
If (V /Q ) is the average equilibrium inventory to sales 
ratio in the i-th sector, then a 1% increase in unsold output leads to 









(ct - x°> . 
Marginal cost depends on the production and input market condi-
tions facing the firm. The production process is summarized in a 
L Kt RMt B 
Leontiff production function, Q •» min(—, -r-, ——, -r-), where 
Q » output in period t 
L - labor services in period t 
K • capital on hand at the end of period t-1 and thus 
available for use throughout period t 
RM • raw materials purchased and used in period t 
Et • energy purchased and used in period t 
a,b,c,d - technical coefficients, assumed invariant over the 
short planning horizon of the firms in this study. 
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Assuming full capacity utilization, a constant rate of capital 
stock depreciation, 5, and the existence of a perfect market for existing 
capital goods, total production cost in period t is 
TC(Qt) - Wt Lt + P*(rt + 6)Kj; + p f RMfc + P* Efc , 
and short run (neo-classical) marginal cost is 
(3.15) MCSRNC = AC = aWt + b(rt + 6)p£ + cP^ + dP^ . 
If we define the long run to be that period of time in which the entire 
capital stock depreciates, then long run (neo-classical) marginal cost 
is 
(3.16) MCLRNC - aWt + b(l + rt)p£ + c P ^ + dP^ . 
2/ 
Without access to a market for existing capital goods,— the firm suffers 
no opportunity cost for holding physical capital. Then short run 
(Keynesian) marginal cost is 
(3 .17) MCSRK - aWt + b<5P* + cP**1 + dP^ , 
t t fc 
and long run (Keynesian) marginal cost is 
K RM PF 
(3.18) MCLRK - aWt + bP^ + cPJT + d " . 
Choosing a set of assumptions about input markets defines the marginal 
cost of each sector. Since all prices are in index form, (3.18), e.g., 
implies 
(3.19) MC* - aR Wt + b R % + cR p f + dR P* , 
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and 
(3.20) MC^ - a, Wt + b, P« + c, p f + d, P* . 
The price and output adjustment equations, (3.5) through (3.8), were . 
estimated using each marginal cost specification. The results are dis-
cussed in Chapter IV. 
B. Labor Market 
Both sectors hire labor services from the single nationwide 
market. Workers are interested in real wage preservation, but wage 
demands are tempered by the state of the labor market. Therefore the 
rate of money wage increase is a function of inflationary expectations 
and excess demand, i.e., 
(3.21) Wt+1 = o, P^ + i - a2(Ut - U*) . 
Workers have myopic inflationary expectations, i.e., they expect infla-
tion next period to equal the rate just observed, so that 
(3.22) P* - PT = TPJ + (l-T)P^ , 
Lt+1 lt C C 
where P_ is the rate of change in the consumer price index and T is 
t 
the share of personal consumption expenditures devoted to the consump-
tion good. U is the unemployment rate; U* is the natural or non-
accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU). 
Nd 
The unemployment rate may be defined as U • 1 -, where 
d s 
N and N are the quantities of labor demanded and supplied, respec-
tively. To relate the level of the unemployment rate to rates of 
change of the endogenous variables in our model, first we differentiate 
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U with respect to time, j£ — — - ~ . Then by using N « (l-U)N8, 
d N S 
we note that —• = (1-U)NS - (l-U)N . Since ~ - Ut+1 - Ut, this implies 
ut+i"ut + a-V^-N*). 
The demand for labor consists of the consumption sector's demand 
and the capital sector's demand, thus N « a C + a. K , where the a.'s 
are the technical labor coefficients from the respective production 
functions. Therefore N • Y L ̂ t
 + ^~YL)Kt, where Y L is the percentage 
3/ of the work force employed in the consumption good sector.— Using this 
we express the unemployment equation as U .. « U + (1-Ut(Nt~YT C - (l-YT)Kt). 
Finally, to keep our macro model a first order linear difference equation 
system, we approximate (1-U ) with (1-U*) and use 
(3.23) Ut+1 - Dt + (1-U*)(N
8 - YL Cfc - (1^)^.) 
as our unemployment relation. U* and N are exogenous to the model. 
C. Other Input Markets 
The raw material market is a Hicks-Okun flex-price market. Thus 
prices are assumed to adjust to clear this market in each time period. 
In general, flex price markets are characterized by the existence of 
stock equilibria brought about by middleman traders who speculate in 
stocks of the flex-price good. To avoid unnecessary complications, there 
are no middlemen in our model. Instead we envision a flex-price market 
that is a well-organized association of price takers; the act of trading 
exacts no transactions cost. In our model the supply of the raw material 
is fixed exogenously before each trading period begins. Thus price 
adjustment is the only mechanism of reaching equilibrium. Equilibrium 
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is reached in each period since raw material producers are assumed to 
desire no inventories. Since each seller is a price taker, there are no 
price adjustment costs. 
Following the formulation of Schlagenhauf and Shupp (53), we 
1 K RM RM 
characterize our raw material market with the expression P • P 






P is a trend or parity term, which reflects the secular path of the 
raw material price vis a vis the rest of the economy. This term is 
positive if the relative price of the raw material is increasing over 
time. This could occur as a result of a fundamental shift in relative 
scarcity, or if producers organize an effective cartel. For purposes 
of this thesis we assume there are no long run shifts in relative 
scarcity, and that cartelization is impossible in the raw material 
market. 
K D „ is a price adjustment elasticity, which measures the 
KM 
response of the raw material price to imbalance between demand, RM , 
~s d 
and supply, RM . Total demand for the raw material is RM " c c
 c
t +
 Cfc K t» 
thus RM B Y„« C„ + (l-YoxJlL, where Y D W is the consumption good sector's 
KM t KM t ATI 
share of the total amount of raw material used. Substituting, we have 
our raw material price equation 
(3.24) P f - P f + ^ ( Y ^ Cfc + ( 1 - Y R M A " RMj) • 
The rate of growth of raw material supply, RM., is subject to random 
shocks (e.g., weather, labor strikes, new discoveries) and thus is 
considered to be exogenous. 
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i.e., P * « P E 
The energy market is also assumed to be flex-price in nature, 
( d^KE 
In this instance, however, we assume an effective 
JL. 
Is E cartel controls the parity or trend term, P . Energy demand is composed 
I C 
of industrial (E ) plus consumer (E ) demand. Industrial demand is 
E • d C + d, K , where the d.'s are the technical coefficients in 
the respective production functions. The final or consumer demand for 
energy is assumed to be a function of national income, Y , and the price 
of energy, thus E. • Y. P. , where <x_ and 3_ are income and price 
t t t £> £j 
elasticities of energy demand, respectively. In rates of change form, 
substitution yields P* - P^ + K £ ( Y E Ct + YE Kt + YE(a£ Yt - 3£ P
E) , 
or our energy price equation 
1 (3.25) P
E = 
1+KE YE eE 
( P t + K E ( Y E £ t + Y E K t + Y E a E Y t - i t ) ) • 
i 3 1 
where the y„ are shares of energy use; Z Y P a !• 
E i-1 E 
Before closing the input market section, we emphasize that the 
capital good is both a final good and an input into the production process. 
Thus the price of capital, which is determined by the profit maximizing 
rule expressed as equation (3.6), is an endogenous element of marginal 
cost for both the capital and the consumption good sectors. This fact 
has implications for optimal demand management policy, discussed in 
Chapter V. 
D. National Income 
Nominal national income or GNP is the sum of the value of produc-
tion in each final demand sector, i.e., 
Yfc - P^ Ct + P
K Kt + P=(£
8 - dc Ct + dfc Kt) . 
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Since the energy market is a flex-price market, i.e., since the price 
of energy adjusts to clear the market in each period, we know 
"*s C 
E - d C + d. K • E , the consumer demand for energy. Then since 
-8 E 
C aE pE Et Yt Pt ' 
it follows that 
Yt = Sc(P^ + Ct) +Sk(P^ + Kt) + SE((1-3E)P
E + a£ Yft) 
Collecting terms yields our national income relation 
(3.26) Yt = 1 - SE aE 
(S c(^ + Ct) + Sk(P^ + Kt) + SE(1 - 3E)P
E) , 
where 
pC c p^ K P
E E^ 
Sc * - H ' Sk = "V" ' SE = "^T ' ̂  Sc + Sk + SE = X ' t t t 
Note that real GNP is 
(3.27) Y R -
• 
1 • 
3. The Demand Side 
A. The Money Market 
1 
" SE aE 
(Sc Ct + Sk Kt) 
The demand for money is a function of national income and the 
interest rate, M » Nr(Y , r ). Following most empirical work, it is 
assumed that the money demand function, M , is linear in natural 
logarithms. Thus In M • JL In Yt - &2 In r£, where the K-i are income 
and interest rate elasticities of the demand for money, respectively. 
d s We assume the money market is always in equilibrium, so that M • M , 
53 
h • 1 and f • -7— Y. - 7— M s. But we prefer to express the level of the 
interest rate as a function of rates of growth of the money supply and 
nominal income, and r . = r* + r • r is nonlinear in r . (r* is the 
long run equilibrium interest rate.) This makes an analytic solution 
to the dynamic system very cumbersome. So we note that 
• 1 • 1 A S _̂_ d r l 1 • 1 A _ _ d r _ , 1 • 1 A \ 
r t " T2
 Y t " T2
 Mt <==> dT,r^ - T2
 Yt ~ T2
 Mt "* dt s % Yt " —2 V
r o • 
Then, approximating r_ with r* and noting that -jr = *t+i ~
 r
t» we have 
(3'28> rt+i " ^ Yt - T-2
 k>* + rt • 
an operational interest rate equation. 
B. Product Demands 
The real demand for the consumption good is the sum of private 
C CP CG 
and government demand, i.e., X = X + X . Private demand is assumed 
to be a function of national income and the price of the consumption good, 
fP n.C P_ C 
i.e., X^ = Y^ P_ , where a and 3 are income and price elasticities t t t c c 
of private demand for the consumption good, respectively. We express 
CG C C C 
government demand as X • G P , where G is the nominal level of 
spending on the consumption good determined exogenously by congress. 
Note we implicitly assumed that the government's price elasticity of 
demand is unity. This assumption is consistent with the nature of the 
budget process, in which congress appropriates dollar amounts of spend-
ing instead of stiuplating the number of units of goods to purchase. 
Combining the private and government demands yields the total demand 
""°r -i 
p rtC P P C 
for the consumption good, X « Y P + G P . In terms of rates 
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of change, our consumption demand equation is 
(3.29) x£ « (ac Yt - 3C p j ) ^ + (G£ - p£) (1 - Cj , 
where C1 is the private share of the demand for the consumption good. 
The real demand for the capital good is also the sum of 
private and government demand, i.e., X « X™ + XT • The private 
KP 
demand, X , stems from the use of capital in the production of both 
the consumption and the capital goods. Thus the private demand for 
capital in our model is investment demand in the usual sense of that 
phrase. Since we assumed the existence of fixed proportion production 
functions in both sectors, the desired capital stock in the next period, 
i* K ., is proportional to expected demand in the next period, i.e., 
K . - b. X .. We assume that expected demand in the next period is 
equal to expected demand in the current period minus an adjustment for 
ie current unexpected inventory movement. In symbols, where X is 
expected demand for the output of the i-th sector, Q is output, AV is 
the change in the inventory level, and k^ is the expectation adjustment 
coefficient, xjjx - X*
e - ky AV*. Recall that V*+1 = Q* + V* - X*, 
AV = V .- - V = Q - X . We assume that each firm produces its expected 
demand during the period, i.e., each firm expects no Inventory movement, 
thus 
<4 ' Xt+i and X t + i " Q t " V ^ t - xt> <=* xt+i • (1 - V^t + *v x t • 
We assume that replacement investment is continuously and autonomously 
planned, but that gross investment is proportional to the difference 
between next period's desired capital stock and what is on hand for 
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production this period. So, in general, where k„ is the capital stock 
adjustment coefficient, the i-th sector's investment demand is 
*f - *K«5l - Kt> + 6 Kt • 
or 
XT " kK(bi{(1 " V Q t + kv Xt} " Kt} + 6 Kt ' 
Note, that since K = b. Q (else Q could not have been produced), this 
formulation allows net investment to be greater than, less than, or 
equal to replacement investment, depending on the relation between 
current demand and production. Government demand for the capital good 
is analogous to the government's demand for the consumption good, i.e., 
KG K K— K 
X = G P , where G is the congressionally determined nominal level 
of spending on the capital good. The total real demand for capital may 
then be expressed as 
A = ̂ ( bK { ( 1 " k X + kv Xt> " Kt> + 6K Kt 
+ 4(bc{(1-kv)Ct + k v X t ) - K t ) + < S c K t , 
+ G« P f ' . 
Combining terms we find 
< K t , K 
V 
1 " *J bK k 
<k* bK(l - k
X)Kt + (6R - k*>|* 
+ k ^ b c ( l . k X + ^
b c k S X t + ( f i c - ^ 
+ G*P* ) . 
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Substituting K* » bi Q* yields 
A K \ uK 
K V 
1 - kjj b „ ki <V
SK " 4 §h * V6c " 4 "X 
+ ̂  bc "v 4 + Gt »f') • 
Thus, the rate of change of real investment demand is 
(3.30) XX = ^ Kt + i|»2 Ct + t3 ij + 1^(6* - p£) , 
where the ifi. represent each component's share of the economy's total 
demand for capital. 
Equations (3.5) through (3.14) and (3.19) through (3.31) constitute 
the complete macro model. Note that (3.13), (3.14), (3.19), (3.20), (3.22), 
(3.24), (3.25), (3.26), (3.29), and (3.30) may be substituted into (3.5) 
through (3.8), (3.21), (3.23), and (3.28), leaving the reduced form of 
our model with seven endogenous variables in the myopic expectations 
case and 11 under the adaptive expectations assumption. In the next 
chapter we discuss the methods used to "flesh out" the model with 
real world parameter estimates, and in Chapter V we observe the properties 
. ^— 
~s E 
of the model as we simulate supply side (e.g., RM , P ) shocks and dis-
cuss stabilization policy responses to those shocks. 
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NOTES 
— The familiar Koyck transformation yields linear versions of (3.2A) 
only if we assume that expectations on all variables are adjusted 
to past errors at the same rate. 
2/ 
— The existence or non-existence of a second hand capital goods market 
is a continuing topic of debate in the two-sector growth literature 
(e.g., see Henderson and Sargent (29), Benavie (10), Woglam (71)). 
It is an issue which separates those who prefer either the Keynesian 
or the neoclassical tradition. An appropriate way to settle the 
debate is to use the alternative specifications of marginal cost 
and observe which formulation exhibits the best explanatory power 
in price and output adjustment equations. While a complete test 
of these conflicting hypotheses is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
we adopt the suggested methodology for the versions of marginal 
cost consistent with the assumed Leontief production function. 
3/ 
— Levels of linear additive functions can be converted to rates of 
change using a device known as the Divisia index. To illustrate, 
consider nominal GNP in an n-sector economy with no government 
spending; _ *} . Unlike its familiar one sector counter-
i=l * x 
part, we may not simply take the natural log of both sides and 
differentiate with respect to time to obtain Y = £ + $. Instead, 
dO. dP 
• Z<Pi i t + Qi "dp PiQi 
Y = =-r—- . But if we multiply the numerator by r—pr-, 
h Fi 4i *i qi 
. S(Q1 + P ^ Q± 
we find Y = =—5—;r , and 
2 Pi Qi I ? i « i 
= the i-th sector's 
share of GNP. Define Y = (P± Q±/2 P̂^ Qi) • Then Y - I Yt&± + Q±)-
Y • I y.(P, + Q.). In the case of labor demand, ai ̂ ifc 
Yi " ac Ct + H Kt' 
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CHAPTER IV 
SOURCES OF PARAMETERS 
This chapter describes the procedures used in obtaining parameter 
estimates for the macro model outlined above. The price and output adjust-
ment equations (3.5) through (3.8), which were derived in Chapter II from 
the dynamic theory of the firm, were estimated directly. Parameter esti-
mates for the remaining equations were adapted from other studies, as 
discussed in Section 2 below. 
1. Estimation of Price and Output Adjustment Equations 
A fundamental issue addressed by this thesis is the role market 
structure plays in influencing price and output adjustment decisions. 
This is the substance of the dynamic theory of the firm outlined in 
Chapter II. A second important issue concerns the macroeconomic impli-
cations of this same market structure. 
In order to test for the influence of market structure on 
the firm's behavior, we need a reasonable definition of the individual 
market in which the firm operates. Ideally, firm specific data are 
best suited to these types of empirical tests. Unfortunately, obtain-
ing comparable data from published sources on individual firms is beyond 
the scope of this thesis.— Most previous studies of market structure 
2/ 
and price determination— have used data at the two and three digit SIC 
3/ 
level of aggregation.— We believe that only the four digit level of 
aggregation is sufficiently detailed to permit a reasonable measure of 
"market" structure. Fortunately, data at this level of disaggregation 
of industries are available in the Census of Manufacturers (15). There 
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are, of course, problems introduced by testing theories of the firm with 
4/ industry data,— but these seem unavoidable. It may be fairly judged, 
however, that if there exists a relation among economic variables at a 
certain level of aggregation, that relation can be no weaker for at 
least some of the individual cases aggregated. Thus a consistent under-
lying theory is useful both for prediction and for interpretation of 
observed empirical results. 
The inability of one-sector macro models to explain stagfla-
tion has led to a renewed call for disaggregated models.— This dis-
aggregation is warranted if the separate sectors behave in at least 
quantitatively if not qualitatively distinct ways. Thus two data samples 
were compiled, one for non-food consumer goods (hereafter called consumer 
goods), and one for capital goods. An industry was characterized as a 
consumer good industry if at least 50% of its total output as reported 
6/ 
in the 1967 Input-Output tables— was a final demand consumption expenditure. 
Likewise 50% of the total output of a capital goods industry had to be 
classified as final demand gross private domestic investment. From 
these sets of qualifying consumer or capital goods industries, four digit 
industries were excluded from the final sample only if data for particular 
variables were unavailable. In most cases of exclusion the unavailable 
item was own price. The final sample consisted of 13 consumer and 18 
capital goods industries, all of which are listed in Appendix IV. 
Both because of the small number of firms and because four digit 
data are available only on an annual basis, pooling of cross-section and 
time series data was considered. Data for each four digit industry were 
collected for the years 1967-1976.— Moreover, reduced form OLS regressions 
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for both the price and output adjustment equations in both the consumer 
goods and the capital goods samples yielded sum of squared residuals 
that suggest pooling over the entire time horizon is appropriate. The 
8/ 
Maddala— F-test for compatabillty of pooled data was used to make this 
determination. The actual "F" values for each sample are given in 
Appendix V. 
Price and output adjustment equations (applicable to each 
sector) depend on the expectation formation hypothesis assumed. If 
expectations are myopic, i.e., if Z .. - Z , then linear approximations 
of the first order conditions appropriate to the firm's dynamic profit 
maximizing behavior dictate the structural forms 
(4.1) Qt = aQ + ax Xt + <*2 7 ^ + c*3 rt + a4 « t + a,. MSt 
+ a& VARt + a? Pt , 
and 
(4.2) Pt - 3Q + 3X Xt + 32 Vt+1 + 33 rt+1 + 34 MRt + g5 MSt 
+ 36 VARt + 3? Qt . 
Adaptive expectations merely add the lagged dependent variable to both 
formulations, i.e., 
(A.3) Qt - Y 0 + Y l Xt + Y2 Vt+1 + Y 3 rt + Y 4 MCt + Y5 MSt 
+ Y6 VARt + Y7 Pt + Y8 Qt_l ' 
and 
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(4.4) Pt « 6Q + 8l Xfc + 62 Vt+1 + 53 rt + *4 MRt + *5 MSt 
+ 56 VARt + 67 Qt + 58 Pt-1 . 
In all equations: 
Q t " 
p t = 
x t -
v t+ l = 
Q t " 





? t - l " 
Q .. - Q = change in output 
Pt+. - P = change in price 
level of demand 
inventory on hand at 12/30/t 
output during period t 
interest rate 
marginal production costs 
market structure 
variance of demand 
Qt " Q t - i 
p t " p t - i 
Each equation in the myopic system, (4.1) and (4.2), is exactly 
identified, thus indirect least squares (ILS), two-stage least squares 
(2SLS), and three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimates are all identical, 
consistent, and asymptotically efficient. Because hypothesis testing 
cannot be performed on the estimates of the structural coefficients 
9/ 
derived from the ILS procedure,— 2SLS was used to estimate (4.1) and 
(A.2). 
A word on the proxies used for market structure (MS) and 
variance (VAR) should preface on discussion of the 2SLS estimates of 
(4.1) and (4.2), which are presented in Table 4-1. The argument 1/D, 
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where D represents Kwoka's (40) dominance index, performed most consistently 
of the different measures of market structure used.— This suggests 
that the causal relation between market structure and price or output 
adjustment is a nonlinear one. The index D, which is defined precisely 
in Appendix VI, increases with the inequality of firm size in an 
industry. Kwoka's empirical results (40) suggest that this index captures 
the essence of market structure that is related to economic performance. 
A general expression of our estimated equations is 
Y = A*(MS) + Zy + u> , 
where Z is a vector of the other explanatory variables, p is a vector of 
structural coefficients, and w is an error term. Since MS = 1/D, it 
3Y —A > * < 
follows that -r£ = -£ == 0 if and only if X = 0. Thus we infer that 3D D2 < > 
increasing dominance or market power has a positive marginal effect on 
the dependent variable if and only if the estimated coefficient of our 
market structure proxy is negative. Conversely, a positive estimated 
coefficient of MS implies that increasing market power reduces the va'lue 
of the dependent variable. 
For variance, we used the inverse of the coefficient of varia-
tion of demand over the entire horizon for each industry. This measure, 
the mean divided by the standard deviation, has the t-distribution since 
it is a normally distributed random variable divided by a chi-square 
random variable. Thus standard t-tests are permissible, and a negative 
sign of the estimated coefficient of our variance proxy implies that, 
ceteris paribus, increasing demand variance increases adjustment responses. 
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TABLE 4-1 
2SLS Estimates of Price and Output Adjustment Equations 
Assuming Myopic Expectations 
K « capital C * consumption 
(a) K - -71.1949 +.153 X* -.314 V* +4.59 r. 
(81.766) (.191) Z (.248) z (7.89) Z 
+.7299* MC* +1.3274 MS* +19.223* VARK -4.328* P* 
(.512) Z (1.73) Z (14.561) Z (3.26) Z 
(b) P* = -33.3641**** +.0689*** X* -.0636*** vf +3.1282**** r. 
Z (5.89) (.027) Z (.024) C (.783) ' 
+.1686**** MR* +.4713*** MSK -2.361 VARK +.1334 K 
(.021) C (.189) C (3.48) C (.132) t 
(c) C = 33.0667*** -.000079 X° -.0656 vj -6.3027**** r. 
Z (12.341) (.0963) (.0809) Z (1.07) C 
+.1285** McJ -.0165 MsJ +9.525 VAR^ +.3781 pj 
(.058) c (.163) C (7.916) C (.4959) C 
(d) P? = -28.3457**** +.0707* X^ -.0477 V?.- -.2594 r. 
Z (6.716) (.0479) C (.047) C"N- (1.384) C 
+.2805**** MR^ +.0218 MsJ +5.9532** VAR^ -.3017 C 
(.0704) C (.0686) C (3.13) Z (.249) C 
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
*The coefficient is significantly different from zero at the .1 level. 
**The coefficient is significantly different from zero at the .05 level. 
***The coefficient is significantly different from zero at the .01 level. 
****The coefficient is significantly different from zero at the .0005 level. 
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Most of the estimated coefficients in the price equation for 
the capital goods sector (equation (b) in Table 4-1) have the predicted 
sign and are significant at the .01 level. Recall that the positive 
y 
cofficient on market structure (MS ) implies that increasing dominance 
or market power reduces the profit maximizing change in price. Thus 
we infer that increasing market power increases the oligopolistic cost 
of changing price in capital goods industries. 
The results include three surprises. First, demand variance 
appears to exert no statistically significant effect on price adjustment. 
Second, the short term interest rate, r , our proxy for expected marginal 
inventory costs, is positively related to price changes. Because of the 
high significance level, .0005, we infer that higher expected marginal 
inventory costs cause prices to rise in order to cover the increases 
costs, rather than decline and reduce inventories. This full cost 
response casts doubt on our assumption of total profit maximization. 
Finally, the positive sign and insignificance of output changes (K) 
on price changes (equation (b)) was not predicted. This result is diffi-
cult to reconcile with the observed (and predicted) negative effect that 
price changes (Pt) have on output changes (equation (a) in Table 4-1). 
In general, the significance levels of the estimated coefficients 
in the output adjustment equation (a) are disappointing when compared to 
the price adjustment equation for the capital goods sector (b). But the 
most startling finding is the positive and significant coefficient of 
v 
marginal cost (MC.). There are a number of interpretations of this result. 
One interpretation follows directly from the theory of the firm this equa-
tion is specified to test. According to the theory developed in Chapter II, 
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it is next period's expected marginal production cost that influences 
output adjustment decisions. Thus the observed positive sign implies 
that higher marginal cost signals still higher future expected marginal 
cost, and this signal induces production as soon as possible, i.e., 
before cost rises further. Obviously this must be merely a short run 
phenomenon, but note that a short planning horizon is the very essence 
of the myopic expectation assumption embodied in the equations reported 
in Table 4-1. 
A positive effect of marginal cost on output adjustment could 
also be observed if non-existent economies of scale were believed present 
and attempts were made to realize them. But the most compelling explana-
tion of the positive coefficient on marginal cost in the capital output 
is that utilization rates are determined exogenously. 
All marginal cost definitions specified in Chapter III are 
essentially weighted average indexes of input prices, since the underly-
ing technology is assumed to be fixed-proportion.— Then the estimated 
positive effect of marginal cost on output adjustment could mean that as 
input prices increase, so do input utilization rates. Thus output increases, 
at least in the short run. Unfortunately, capital utilization rates are 
not available at the four digit level of industry disaggregation. Thus 
we are unable to confirm this supposition at present. 
Although the goodness of fit is obviously less, the price adjust-
ment equation for consumption good industries (d) is similar to its capital 
goods counterpart (b). Two notable differences are the insignificance of 
the market structure proxy and the positive, significant effect of the 
inverse of the coefficient of variation. This implies firms with higher 
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demand variance change price less. Perhaps non-price competition is 
more important to these consumption good firms than varying price over 
the business cycle. 
The consumption good output adjustment equation (c) is quali-
tatively Identical to the capital goods equation (a) except for the 
significant negative impact of the short term interest rate (r.), suggest-
ing that inventory carrying costs are more important to consumer goods 
producers than to capital goods producers. Again, the observed effect of 
marginal cost on output adjustment is positive. Neither of the jointly 
— —C 
dependent variables, C and P , exert a statistically significant effect 
on the other. Thus we tentatively infer that price and output adjustment 
decisions are made more or less independently in consumer goods industries. 
Turning now to the adaptive expectation formulation, (4.3) and 
(4.4), we note that each equation is overidentified, thus only three-
stage least squares estimates are asymptotically efficient as well as 
consistent. The 3SLS estimates of (4.3) and (4.4) for each sample are 
reported in Table 4-2. 
As in the myopic expectations case, dominance or market power 
exerts a dampening effect on price increases in the capital goods sector 
(equation (f)), and the short term interest rate or marginal inventory 
cost (r ) elicits cost covering or full cost price effects. The major 
difference in the estimated price adjustment equation for capital goods 
industries under adaptive and myopic expectations (equation (b) in Table 
4-1) is that the adaptive results imply there exists a negative relation 
between changes in output (K ) and changes in price (P ). This means, 
e.g., that price increases normally forthcoming from an increase in demand 
are dampended to the degree that output increases. 
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TABLE 4-2 
3SLS Estimates of Price and Output Adjustment Equations 
Assuming Adaptive Expectations 
K » Capital C » Consumption 
(e) K.. - 51.44*** +.323** X? +1.014** V* -50.471*** r,. 
(20.11) (.188) c (.497) ZL (19.589) C 
-3.5145*** MCK -8.2965** MS K +6.26 VARK +17.234** P -2.84*** K. 
(1.394) C (3.887) Z (20.87) Z (7.48) Z (.86) t 
(f) P* = -26.44**** +.06499** X? -.07907*** vjL, +1.596*** r 
Z (4.57) (.0303) Z (.029) Z X (.631) Z 
+.2144**** MRK +.3929** MSK +3.3632 VARK -.1911** K.. -.1315 P? 
(.0503) C (.212) C (3.809) C (.115) C (.1509) t~1 
(g) C. = 28.38** +.0036 xj -.0056 vj . -6.2433**** r. 
C (13.34) (.099) Z (.082) t"1"1 (1.105) C 
+.1452** MC^ +.0237 MS^ +15.545** VAR0. +.13 P? -.0438 C. . 
(.064) (.1736) (8.234) C (1.47) (.0787) t"i 
(h) P? = -28.3933**** +.0727* xj? -.0447 V?., +.1821 r. 
C (8.177) (.045) C (.0418) ̂  (1.126) Z 
+.2423*** MRJ? +.0179 MsJ +5.708** VARJ -.237 C +.1047 P? , 
(.075) C (.0695) * (3.35) C (.194) C (.139) Z~1 
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
*The coefficient is significantly different from zero at the .1 level. 
**The coefficient is significantly different from zero at the .05 level. 
***The coefficient is significantly different from zero at the .01 level. 
****The coefficient is significantly different from zero at the .0005 level. 
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Many more variables in the output adjustment equation for capital 
goods industries (e) are significantly different from zero under the assump-
tion of adaptive expectations than under myopic expectations (equation (a) 
in Table 4-1). Moreover, the marginal cost coefficient has the predicted 
negative sign. Note also that MS • 1/D is negatively and significantly 
related to changes in the output of capital goods, suggesting that the 
barriers to entry and internal adjustment cost factors discussed in 
Chapter II decrease output adjustment costs as dominance increases in the 
capital goods sector. The major surprise under adaptive expectations is 
the positive effect that changes in price (P ) have on changes in output 
(K., equation (e)), when compared with the negative effect that changes 
in output have on price changes (equation (f)). If both effects were 
not statistically significant at the .05 level, we might attribute this 
anomoly to multicollinearity of the jointly determined dependent variables 
with the other explanatory variables. But multicollinearity increases the 
standard errors of correlated variables' estimated coefficients. Since 
each variable is significant, and since 3SLS estimates are asymptotically 
efficient, we are led to accept the results as descriptive of behavior 
within the capital goods sector. A possible explanation of the jointly 
significant coefficients is that output increases do reduce the need to 
increase prices, but that price increases are seldom made without 
simultaneously increasing output. 
Equations (g) and (h) show that just as in the myopic expecta-
tions results, the consumption goods sector is less well explained than 
is the capital goods sector. Market structure appears to play no role, 
and increased variance dampens both price and output adjustments in the 
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consumption goods equations. We suspect that measures of non-price 
competitive behavior could improve the estimates of price and output 
adjustment in consumption good industries. Marginal cost is once again 
positively related to changes in output, and there appears to be no 
significant simultaneity across equations. This finding led to an 
estimate of (4.3) and (4.4) for the consumption goods sector using 
Zellner's seemingly unrelated regressions technique, excluding the 
theoretically jointly determined dependent variables as explanatory 
variables. These results were qualitatively identical to the 3SLS 
estimates. We therefore infer that price and output decisions in the 
consumption sector are made independently. 
All estimated equations used variables in index form, thus each 
coefficient may be interpreted as the effect a 1% change in an explanatory 
variable has on the percentage change of price or output in one year. 
While this approximation is accurate for percentage changes near 1%, 
the reported coefficient estimates actually measure the effect that 
changing levels of explanatory variables have on changes in the level 
of dependent variables. This is precisely consistent with the theory 
of adjustment developed in Chapter II, but leaves us somewhat short of 
true elasticities necessary for formulation of the full macro model in 
terms of rates of change. 
The problem may be illustrated by the following example. The 
regression equations are of the form Y . - Y « eQ + Q. Xlt + 62 X2 + ... + u>t, 
where Y « the dependent variable (price or output), X. • the i-th 
explanatory variable, 9. • the estimated coefficient of the i-th explanatory 
variable, and u • an error term. The 6. are reported in Tables 4-1 and 
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4-2. From our example's specification, 
5
 8<YfrH - V , 8 Yt+1 i t . 
1 8xlt 8 x l t W 
i.e., 6. is not a true elasticity. But the regression equation may be 
rewritten as Y . «* fcL + 6, X. + §2 X2 + ... + Y + u . Then we see 
3 Yt+1 
that §. + T-T » and the elasticity of the dependent variable with respect 
^•t * x i _ _ 
to Xj may be approximated by 8. ~ , where X. and Y are variable means. 
This procedure was followed to calculate the coefficients of our price 
and output adjustment equations that were actually used in the macro 
model simulations of Chapter V. 
The only exception to this procedure was in the case of the 
interest rate. We expect the level of the interest rate to affect the 
rate of change of prices and output. Thus we desire 
3 lnYt+i l i t+i _i__±h 
9 rt " 8 rt Yt+1 Y ' 
That is to say, we divide the estimated coefficient of r by the mean of 
the dependent variable to get the interest rate coefficient used in the 
simulations. 
2. Other Parameter Sources 
The wage equation coefficients, o. and o„, were adapted from 
a study by Perry (49). The proportion of final consumption spending 
devoted to energy, 1-T, was computed from the detailed expenditures 
tables for 1979 in the Survey of Current Business, K^. and «E» the 
price adjustment elasticities in the flex-price raw material and energy 
markets, were taken from Schlagenhauf and Shupp (53). The shares of 
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national product attributable to each sector, the s., were computed from 
1979 Survey of Current Business data. These s. and the mean input coeffi-
cients for each industry type were then used to construct the y2, the 
share of consumption of the j-th good by the i-th sector. The raw material 
example will be detailed to illustrate this process. 
From the Survey of Current Business, consumption goods make up 
59% of GDP and investment goods 16%. These final goods were presumed 
to use all of the raw material consumed in the model. Since each unit of 
C requires .436 units of material input (c ), and each K. requires .393 
(Cj.), the total material used in the model is 
(.59+9.16)(-*36)Y + (.59,+6.l6)('393)Y " ' 3 4 Y + ' 0 8 Y " ' 4 2 Y * 
RM *̂4 
Then Y , the consumption good's share, is -^TJ = .81. 
The price elasticity of the consumption demand for energy, 3E> 
was estimated by Griffin (26). Branson (11) supplied the money demand 
elasticities of the interest rate equation, SL. and £•-. The government 
purchase bundle was presumed to be roughly the same proportion as private 
C K 
expenditures, i.e., G =.8G + G = .2G, where G • total government spend-
ing. Thus since SG = .2, .16Y is government purchases of consumption 
goods, and S = .59 => 79% of all consumption demand is private. This 
.79 •= C- is the consumption demand equation. 
The price elasticity of consumption demand, 3„, was taken from 
estimates reported in Ferguson and Gould (21), and Nicholson (47). The 
coefficients in the marginal cost equation, the a., b., c., and d^, are 
the mean input proportions of each industry type and were computed from 
1972 Census of Manufacturers data as described in Appendix VI. 
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The iK of the investment demand equation required five parameter 
estimates. The kg, the capital stock adjustment coefficients, were derived 
from capital project duration values described in Jorgenson (34). The 
ky, the demand expectation adjustment coefficients, were taken from 
estimates of the effect that recent sales observations have on sales 
expectations which were reported in Eisner (18). The method of comput-
ing the b., the share of capital services in a unit of output, the Leontief 
production function coefficients, was described above. Also described 
above were the s., the shares of each final demand sector in GNP. Finally, 
the 6., yearly depreciation estimates, were adapted from Jorgenson and 
Stephenson (36). The price elasticity of investment demand, ru, was 
derived from the estimates of Jorgenson and Siebert (35). 
The actual coefficients used in the macro model simulations 
are provided in Appendix VII. 
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NOTES 
— See Winn (69) for an heroic effort and useful guide to what data is 
available at the firm level. 
2/ 
— To our knowledge this is the first study of market structure's effect 
on simultaneous price and output adjustmenti 
3/ 
— See, e.g., Eckstein and Wyss (17), Strazheim and Strazheim (61). 
4/ 
— See Brechling (12) for a discussion of these issues. 
-''Klein (38). 
— The 368-sector input-output data was supplied on tape by the Energy 
Research Group at the University of Illinois, Urbana. 
1976 was the most recent year for \ 
and inventory data were available. 
— which four digit output, sales, 
^Maddala (42), pp. 322-323. 
9/ 
- Johnston (33), p. 377. ILS is OLS on the reduced forms. The OLS 
estimates are BLUE, but this property does not hold on transforma-
tion, thus the structural coefficient standard errors cannot be 
deduced from the reduced form estimates. 
—'In addition to 1/D, we used the four firm concentration ratio, CR4, 
the marginal concentration ration, MCRD = CR0 - CR,, an average size 
CRA MCRO * 8 8 4» 
difference proxy —r r—, and the dominance index D by itself. 
11/ 
— All marginal cost definitions were used with virtually identical 
results under all specifications of Q. and P estimated. The 
reported results used MCKLR - aWt + bP
K + CPRM + d PE. Given 
identical expirical explanatory power, the Keynesian cost formula-
tions are preferred to the neoclassical ones for our purposes 
since the full macro model has r as an endogenous variable, and 
thus a nonlinearity would be introduced by the neoclassical formula-
tions into our difference equation system. MCKLR was chosen over 
MCKSR since all data used in the estimation was yearly. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUPPLY SHOCKS AND STABILIZATION POLICY RESPONSES 
In this chapter, the macro model developed above is subjected 
to severe input supply shocks similar to those that actually occurred 
in the'early seventies. The economy's response to these shocks is 
first observed when a passive or steady state stabilization policy is 
assumed. Next, optimal stabilization policy responses to these shocks 
are dervived for a set of distinct criterion functions, each reflecting 
a particular set of social priorities. Finally, the salient characteristics 
of these derived policy rules and of the economy's response to them are 
discussed. Chapter VI contains a brief summary of the entire thesis and 
some suggestions for further research. 
1. The Model Used for the Simulations 
This section describes how the general macro model, developed 
in Chapter III, was given numerical parameters for our simulation experi-
ments. As reported in Chapter IV, the price and output adjustment equa-
tions for both the capital and the consumer goods sectors, equations (3.5) 
through (3.8), were estimated directly. Following the procedure outlined 
in Chapter IV (an example is detailed in Appendix VII), the estimated coeffi-
cients were converted into annual adjustment elasticities. Two sets of 
elasticities were calculated for the price and output adjustment 
equations estimated under each expectation formation hypothesis. One 
set of elasticities was derived using the point estimate of each 
coefficient in the structural equations, regardless of the level of 
significance. The other set of elasticities was computed using significant 
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(a <_ .1) coefficient estimates only. Thus there are four sets of price 
and output adjustment equations. Each set is classified by expectation 
assumption (myopic or adaptive) and by the inclusivity of point estimates 
used (significant only or all). 
Elasticities for the remaining equations of our macro model, 
equations (3.17) through (3.30), were calculated exactly as described 
in Chapter IV. Because they were adapted from other studies or published 
sources, these elasticities varied neither with significance levels nor 
with expectation assumptions. Thus there was but one set of these 
coefficients. 
Substituting the contemporaneous equations (of the form X = X(Z ), 
e.g., marginal cost, the product demand equations, etc.) into the intrinsically 
dynamic ones (of the form Y . * Y(Y ,X ), e.g., the price and output adjust-
ment equations, the wage equation, etc.) yields the complete reduced form 
of the model. Under the assumption of myopic expectations the model 
reduces to seven equations—the price and output adjustment equations in 
both the capital and the consumption sectors, and the equations for the 
money wage, the interest rate, and the unemployment rate. The assumption 
of adaptive expectations adds the lagged price and output adjustment 
identities (equations (3.9) through (3.12)); thus there are eleven equa-
tions in this reduced form. 
Because there were four sets of price and output adjustment equa-
tion coefficients, four numerical reduced form models were obtained upon 
substitution. None of these models satisfied sufficient conditions for 
stability.— and all of them exhibited explosive oscillations when 
perturbed slightly from the steady state. Thus the estimated models 
required adjustment before meaningful analysis could be performed. 
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Since the estimates obtained given the adaptive expectations 
hypothesis appeared more consistent with the data (23 significant 
coefficients versus 16 for the myopic case), it was decided to concentrate 
on them. Given this model, stability was achieved by replacing some 
of the point estimates with values within their respective 95% confi-
dence intervals, and by spreading some impacts over time. The one 
exception to this procedure was the coefficient on the marginal cost 
of consumption which had the "wrong" sign. While the original coeffi-
cient was positive, a negative value, one-third the absolute value of 
the estimated marginal cost coefficient was used in the capital good 
output adjustment equation. The elasticity coefficients actually used 
in the simulations are reported and compared to those derived from 
the point estimates in Appendix VII. 
As a brief digression, the implications our elasticities 
have for two longstanding debates are considered. Fundamentally, the 
macroeconomic debate over the Keynesian emphasis on quantity adjust-
ments and the administered pricing debate in the industrial organiza-
tion literature are identical. Both sets of issues reduce to arguments 
over the relative demand sensitivities of price and output in the short 
run. Keynes observed that modern economies in which the money wage serves 
as a numeraire rely heavily on output adjustments. He used this hypothesis 
to construct an analytical apparatus capable of explaining the great 
slump. Gardiner Means observed that prices were relatively rigid 
downward in less competitive industries and speculated that this result 
had something to do with market structure. However, neoclassical 
macroeconomists have never accepted the proposition that prices and 
wages fail to adjust toward equilibrium, and George Stigler has claimed 
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that actual transactions prices varied more than Means' results implied. 
Thus the respective debates were enjoined. 
Our contribution to these debates is summarized in Table 5-1. 
Table 5-1 
Elasticities Derived from our Estimates 
T) 
d In 1 
ij d In j 
K = capital output 
C = consumption good output 
P = price of the i-th good 
X = demand for the i-th good 
n v = .4166 n v v - .0546 
KXK P*XK 
n r - .118 n r r « .141 
cxc PCXC 
The basic conclusion supported by Table 5-1 is that the capital goods 
sector behaves rather like the textbook Keynesian firm and the consumer 
goods sector exhibits more neoclassical behavior. The demand elasticity 
of output is almost eight times as large as the demand elasticity of 
price in the capital goods sector. Conversely, in the consumption sector, 
an increase in demand is translated into a larger percentage increase 
in price than in output. Recall from Chapter IV that the capital goods 
sector was the only one in which market structure exerted a statistically 
significant effect. Our estimates implied that increased market power 
or dominance dampened the profit maximizing price responses and increased 
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the magnitude of the profit maximizing output responses to any exogenous 
shock. Thus it appears that the relative costs of adjustment introduced 
by firms' recognition of mutual interdependence, explained in Chapter 
II, contribute to making a firm or industry more Keynesian, i.e., will-
ing to hold "administered" prices constant and adjust output in the face 
of shifting short run demand. But as the consumption sector results imply, 
modeling the entire economy this way appears to be inappropriate. 
2. The Simulated Input Supply Shocks 
Two separate input supply shocks were introduced to our economy: 
(1) zero growth in the raw material supply for four consecutive periods; 
and (2) a 100% increase in the energy price parity term, spread evenly 
over four consecutive periods. The economy's performance is reported 
in Tables 5-2 and 5-3. 
The notation used in the tables is as follows: 
t = time period 
K = rate of growth of output of the capital good 
if 
P = rate of change of the price of the capital good 
C. = rate of growth of output of the consumption good 
p£ = rate of change of the price of the consumption good 
W. = rate of change of money wages 
rt
 a the nominal interest rate 
U • the unemployment rate 
Y » nominal GNP 
Y* - real GNP 
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RM 
P • rate of change in the price of the raw material 
E 
Pr B rate of change In the price of energy 
CPI * rate of change of the consumer price index, CPI - TP + (1—r)P 
RM8 « rate of growth of the raw material supply 
~"E 
P » rate of change in the energy price parity term 
M • rate of growth of the money supply 
G = rate of growth of nominal government spending on 
the capital good 
Q 
G = rate of growth of nominal government spending on 
the consumption good 
Because the long run growth rate of each good in the economy 
was assumed to be 4%, the raw material supply shocks was equivalent to 
a cumulative 16% decline from targeted supply. We note in Table 
5-2 that the economy began in long run equilibrium in period 1. Period 2 
RM 
is the beginning of the shock; the price of the raw material, P , 
increased 2.4%. In period 3 we see that the economy's initial response 
to the raw material supply shock was inflation (the CPI rose .304%) and 
ID 
a decreased rate of growth of output (the growth of real GNP, Y , fell 
from 4% to 2.79%). This growth recession translated into decreased 
demand for inputs relative to their supply growth rates. Thus by period 
4 unemployment had increased (from 5.0 to 6.13), energy prices were fall-
E 
ing (Pt » -.53), and the upward pressure on price in the raw material 
market caused by the decreased supply was mitigated by this decreased 
RM 
input demand (P4 • 1.67, down from the 2.4 in t - 2). By the 5th 
period, the last period of the shock, unemployment was so high (U- • 7.4) 
that money wages fell (W- • -.08) despite inflation (CPI - .446). In 
Table 5-2 
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period 6, when the raw material supply (RM ) returned to its steady state 
growth rate of 4%, the low input demand resulting from the growth 
RM 
recession caused a decline in input prices (W, • -.28, P, • -1.35, 
E K 
P, * -.9, Pg • 0.0) and thus marginal costs actually fell. This decline 
in costs was responsible for the ensuing recovery in the consumption 
sector (C increases from 1.43 in the trough of period 6 to 4.28 in 
K K 
period 12), decreases in the price of the capital good (P, • 0.0, P1? • -.72), 
C C and the mitigation of inflation in consumption prices (P, * .5, P., = -.55). 
These trends continued throughout the recovery in real out-
put (Y moved from 1.74 in period 6 to 4.55 in period 12). In period 12, 
when consumption output was no longer below its long run rate of growth, 
unemployment began its descent (U-, = 15.20, U.„ = 14.98) and flex-price 
RM E 
input prices started to rise (P-2 = .06, P12 = .1). Marginal costs still 
fell, however, since unemployment had reached such heights that wages 
continued to fall throughout the horizon (W is less than zero for all 
t > 4). This decline in costs made the profit maximizing output rates 
higher than in the original steady state (K is above 4.0% in every 
period after t = 7 and C grew faster than the long run equilibrium 
rate from t - 12 until well beyond the end of the horizon). The economy 
continued its slightly dampened cyclical fluctuations for more than 120 
periods, eventually settling down to the old steady state rates of 
growth. 
Although obviously not identical to the actual behavior of 
the economy in the mid-seventies, our economy did respond initially in 
a qualitatively similar fashion, and the results highlight the most 
serious areas of unrealism in the model. First, in common with the 
82 
real world, we note that any input supply shock will cause a transfer 
of income across sectors. In this model of a closed economy, the increased 
income of the raw material sector was spent on final goods, thus 
recovery was complete. But the implicit increased consumption by the 
owners of the raw material input was made possible by a substantial 
real wage decline and a decline in labor's share of national income 
through the 20 period horizon. In the long run, the real wage returned 
to its steady state level, but the performance of this model suggests 
the long run may be very long indeed. Furthermore, the initial trans-
fer of income was never reversed. 
The capital and consumption good producers lost some real 
income to the raw material sector, but not nearly as much as workers. 
The transfer from final goods producers to input suppliers was limited 
by the implicit assumption of homogeneous consumption-saving habits 
throughout the economy and by the closed economy preventing leakages to 
foreign producers. But the most serious divergence from recent history 
was the net price deflationary impact of an initially inflationary 
supply shock. This result was primarily due to eventual cost declines, 
suggesting that the lack of downward money wage rigidity was a serious 
ommlssion in our model. 
We may infer that the existence of stagflation can be explained 
with profit maximizing supply side behavior and input supply shocks. 
But to understand the persistence of stagflation we must incorporate 
rigidities similar to those employed in Keynes' analytical framework. 
If we instead build in more neoclassical money wage adjustments, shock-
induced stagflation quickly dissolves into cyclical fluctuations, as 
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our model illustrates. Perhaps Hicks' relative wage hypothesis should 
be extended to encompass all sectors of the economy; managers, workers, 
and asset owners alike. 
To further illustrate the mechanics of our economy's response 
to input supply shocks, consider Figure 5-1. Graph (a) depicts the 
relation between inflation, P (in this case P represents the GNP deflator), 
*R 
and the rate of growth of real output, Y . Thus the relation of (a) is 
very similar to an aggregate supply function. Note that the aggregate 
supply relation is parameterized by the rate of increase of marginal 
cost, MC. The relation depicts the idea embodied in our price and out-
put adjustment equations that for a given rate of change in MC, the rate 
of growth of output can be induced to increase only if output prices 
rise, i.e., only if inflation increases. If the rate of increase of 
* * • 
marginal cost increases, e.g., from MC to MC , our relation shows that 
inflation must increase if the previous rate of growth of output is to 
be maintained. 
The figure drawn in (b) describes the relation between the rate 
•R of growth of output, Y , and the unemployment rate, U, thus the slope is 
determined by our economy's demand for labor. Since all production func-
•R 
tions are Leontief, the slope of our U(Y ) function is determined by the 
labor requirements coefficients in the separate sectors. Movement along 
the curve is caused by a change in the rate of balanced growth. The 
economy will move off of the curve in the case of unbalanced growth. 
In (c) we trace a 45° line to permit mapping into Phillips 
curve space in (d). The slope of our economy's Phillips curve, the 







parameters that specify the interaction of the labor market, the marginal 
cost equations, and the price and output adjustment equations. Thus this 
slope is constant for a given set of parameters (elasticity coefficients). 
However, the Phillips relation as a whole can shift, as it is parameterized 
by inflationary expectations. This fact derives from the wage equation's 
(3.21) inflationary expectations term. 
The inflation coordinate of the economy's position in (d) is 
• R * *R 
determined in (a) given a Y and a MC. This same Y mapped upward to (b) 
yields a unique U. Using the 45° line of (c), we then map unemployment 
downward into (d). The intersection of the mapping of unemployment 
down and the mapping of inflation across into (d) is the economy's 
•R • 
position. For example, if Y = Y* and MC = 0, we are at Point A in 
(a). This corresponds to Point C and U* in (b), and together we have 
Point D in (d). A movement along the aggregate supply relation from A 
to A', caused, e.g., by a balanced increase in the rate of growth of 
•R 
government spending, corresponds to a movement down U(Y ) in (b) and 
upward along the Phillips curve toward Point F. 
*R 
The economy is in long run equilibrium with Y = Y* and U • U* 
at Point D in graph (d). Now consider the effect of our raw material 
supply shock. First, marginal costs increase, shifting the aggregate 
supply relation upward to P(Y ,MC), and propelling the economy along 
the drawn path from Point A to Point B. Point B represents inflation 
as well as lower growth, thus the demand for labor falls (relative to 
supply) and unemployment rises in (b). In the downphase of our model's 
•R 
growth recession we move above the balanced growth U(Y ) line, since 
the initial severity of the recession is much greater in the dominant 
consumption sector. 
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Mapping both the increased inflation and unemployment into 
(d) yields the economy's position at Point E, on the new Phillips curve 
•e' 
P(U,P ). Since inflationary expectations are completely endogenous in 
our model (P® = PT • T P + (1-T)P E), the Phillips curve was shifted 
Lt+1 t c z 
upward by the occurrence of inflation. Note that if inflationary expecta-
•e' 
tions became rigid at P , the new NAIRU, i.e., the new non-accelerating 
inflation rate of unemployment would be much higher than the original, i.e., 
(U*' > U*). Something similar to this may have occurred in the real world, 
with inflationary expectations buoyed by continued inflation, which in 
turn was sustained by downward wage inflexibility. 
But in our model, downward wage flexibility and the softening 
of input demands by the growth recession led to declining marginal costs 
when the raw material supply growth returned to normal in period 6. This 
cost decline, made possible and indeed amplified by downward wage flex-
ibility, projects the economy along the counter-clockwise loops drawn 
in (a) and (b), while continuing on the clockwise path drawn in (d). 
The movements along the loops of (a) and (d) correspond to shifts in the 
respective curves, powered by the dynamic paths of costs and inflation 
described above in our detailed recounting of the simulation experiment. 
We have drawn the loops as if the economy returns to the long run equi-
librium after one cycle. In fact our numerical model exhibited dampened 
but recurring fluctuations that persisted for at least 120 periods. 
Thus precisely accurate loops would be drawn as convergent spirals. 
Table 5-3 shows that the energy price shock increased the CPI 
much more than the raw material supply shock, and thus wages rose even 
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halted. This persistent and significant endogenous cost increase 
coupled with the exogenous energy price increase made the resulting 
growth recession more severe, increasing the unemployment peak and 
concomitant real wage decline. The mechanism leading to recovery and 
the following cycles is identical to that described above. 
4. Optimal Policies 
Optimal policy responses to the shocks were calculated by 
minimizing a dynamic criterion function subject to the constraints 
imposed by our dynamic reduced form macro model. The criterion or 
social disutility function used was: 
T+1 
W = E {1/2 e.(PT - P*)
2 + 1/2 6 (C. - C*) 2 + 1/2 6,(K. - K*) 2 
t-1 t l L Z J Z 
+ 1/2 6 (Ut - U*)
2 + 1/2 Y 1(G^ - G
C*) 2 + 1/2 Y 2(G K - G
K*) 2 




P = T P + (l-x)P • the rate of increase in the CPI 
t 
r 
P = the rate of increase in the price of the consumption good 
E 
P • the rate of increase in the price of energy 
T • the share of personal consumption expenditures devoted to 
the consumption good 
C B the rate of growth of output of the consumption good 
K. •» the rate of growth of output of the capital good 
U " the unemployment rate 
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Q 
G • the rate of growth of government expenditures on the consumption 
good 
G = the rate of growth of government expenditures on the capital 
good 
M » the rate of growth of the money supply. 
All starred variables are long run equilibrium rates. Alternative social 
priorities were expressed by varying the weights, 6., assigned to the 
state variables in the criterion function. Three distinct weighting 
schemes were used. These are given in Table 5-4. 
In addition, the cost of pursuing alternative stabilization 
policies was identified by varying the coefficients, YJ» associated with 
the use of each instrument. Table 5-5 describes the sets of policy 
penalties used. 
Before discussing optimal policies we should clarify the 
effects our policy instruments have in the model. We consider money 
growth first, in Figure 5-2. 
In graph (a) we have the money demand function, M (r,Y ,P). 
This relation summarizes the economy's transaction (M«,M_ > 0) and asset 
•d 
(M, < 0) demands for cash balances. As in our formal model, this money 
demand function is specified in terms of rates of change. Also in 
*s 
graph (a) we have drawn the rate of growth of the money supply, M . 
This is assumed to be under the complete control of the monetary authorities. 
Equilibrium in the money market is obtained when M » M , thus r is an 
equilibrium interest rate. 
•R 
The rate of growth of real GNP (Y ) and output price inflation 
(P) as functions of the interest rate are shown in (b). An increase in 
90 
Table 5-4 
Conservative Liberal Moderate 
8X - 4 94
 94 - 4 91 91 " 94 " 62 + 93 
h + 93 " 2 94 92 + 93 " 2 91 
The sizes of 92 and 9. were determined by their relative weights 
in real GNP. 
Table 5-5 
Fiscal Reliance Monetary Reliance Pure Activism 
Y3 = 100 y 1 Y-L • Y2 - 100 Y3 Yx = Y2 - Y3 
Y 2 " Yl 









the interest rate slows the rate of growth of real output in our model 
since inventories become more expensive to finance. We have modelled 
output price inflation to increase with the interest rate based on our 
empirical results. The full cost response we observed in both sectors 
can be explained by the firm's preference for recouping cost increases 
by raising prices instead of lowering prices to reduce inventories. 
To illustrate the effect of money in our model, suppose the 
economy is initially in long run equilibrium so that M =» Y*, r = r , 
* *R 
P • 0 (Point A in (b)), and Y = Y* (Point B). Now suppose the monetary 
' * s 
authorities decrease the rate of growth of the money supply, from M to 
•s' 
M . This causes an increase in the interest rate as those who desire 
cash balances bid up the price of the relatively smaller supply of 
money. Mapping this increase in the interest rate upward to (b), we 
see that inflation increases to cover the increased inventory holding 
costs, i.e., we move along P(r) from A to A'. Simultaneously the rate 
of growth of output declines (B to B'). Thus we see that if money 
supply growth is less than the economy's long run equilibrium growth 
rate, the scramble for cash balances to finance inflationary transactions 
will lower the rate of sustainable output growth, unless there is a 
general decline in liquidity preference (i.e., unless M shifts downward). 
The effect of government spending on our economy is straight-
forward. Increasing the nominal spending on any good increases the demand 
for that good and induces increases in price and output according to the 
response parameters of the price and output adjustment equations. In 
our model of endogenous supply side behavior, price increases brought 
on by excess demand are eventually translated into cost increases. In 
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the case of the capital good, this cost effect is immediate, since the 
capital good is an input into the productive process. Thus a decline in 
•K 
the rate of growth of government demand for the capital good, G , lowers 
marginal production costs to the degree that capital prices are responsive 
to changes in demand. 
The effect on costs of changing the rate of growth of govern-
•C 
ment demand for the consumption good, G , is much less direct. Decreasing 
•C 
G will lower the rate of increase of the price of the consumption good. 
Since the price of the consumption good dominates the CPI, a decline in 
•C 
P will reduce wage demands to preserve the real wage. Thus costs 
could decline or rise less rapidly if the rate of growth of government 
spending on the consumption good is held down. However, this impact is 
delayed, for the link from government demand to cost effects requires 
three steps. Thus an immediate cost effect of government spending can be 
effectuated only through the capital good component. 
Each policy preference was combined with each social priority 
scheme to derive "optimal" policy paths for each shock. The responses 
of the economy and the optimal policies for each preference configuration 
are reported in Tables 5-6 through 5-23. 
While the results obviously vary with the preference functions, 
the optimal policies share certain characteristics that are common to 
all preferences and both shocks. Each stagflation-inducing input supply 
shock is immediately financed with an acceleration in the growth of the 
money supply. Stagflation was in our model and is in the real world an 
essentially transitory phenomenon. It occurs when market economies are 
adjusting to fundamentally altered relative prices. It can persist only 
Table 5-6 
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Raw Material Shock, Optimal Policy Responses, Liberal-Fiscal Preferences 






















































































































































































































































































































































- . 42 
- .36 
- . 2 1 
- .12 
YK 
































































































































































































4 . 0 










































4 . 0 
4 . 0 
4 . 0 
4 . 0 
4 . 0 
4 . 0 
4 . 0 
4 . 0 
4 . 0 
4 . 0 
4 . 0 
4 . 0 
4 . 0 
4 . 0 
4 . 0 
4 . 0 
PE 
0 . 0 
0 .0 
0 . 0 
0 .0 
0 .0 
0 . 0 
0 .0 
0 .0 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































as long as the price adjustment rigidities inherent in the institutional 
structure of a society retard movement to the new equilibrium alignment. 
Increasing the rate of growth of the money supply lubricates this transi-
tion mechanism. It finances the real income transfer occurring as a 
result of the supply shock. In addition, the monetary expansion allows 
maintenance of a higher level of activity in the rest of the economy, 
thus softening the initial recession while injecting funds that will be 
necessary for the ensuing recovery in an inflationary environment. The 
greater the initial burst of inflation, the greater the optimal immediate 
monetary growth response. This can be seen by comparing the optimal 
first period money supply growth rate under the energy price shock to 
the optimal first period money supply growth rate (with the appropriate 
preference set) in the less inflationary raw material shock case. 
While the stereotype conservatives, moderates, and liberals 
all agree that an input supply shock should be met with monetary 
accommodation, they also agree that monetary restraint should be 
imposed relatively soon thereafter. The longest duration of optimal 
expansionary money supply growth was five periods. While the magnitudes 
differed according to preferences, the optimal paths exhibited a common 
U-shape, starting above the long run equilibrium rate M*, declining 
and reaching a single minimum substantially below M*, then rising back 
to M* at the end of the horizon. This path is illustrated in Figure 5-3. 
M(tK FIGURE 5:3 
M*-4% 
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The amplitude is more extreme when monetary policy is the only instru-
ment. We conclude that after the initial transition period is funded, 
the money supply growth rate should be decreased to dampen the excess 
demand forces building in the ensuing recovery. But this monetary 
restraint should be gradually relaxed as the economy tapers down toward 
its long run equilibrium growth level from its low cost-induced peak. 
General characteristics of fiscal policy rules were also 
discemable. In all cases the best initial response to the input supply 
shock was to reduce government demand, especially for the capital good. 
It was more important to reduce capital demand because the price of 
the capital good was an element of cost in both of the major final 
demand sectors. The induced decline in the price of the capital good 
helped hold down costs in the first inflationary days of the shock, 
thus mitigating the severity of the unavoidable recession. After the 
initial decline, the optimal rates of growth of government demand 
increased monotonically until the economy's real growth rate had sur-
passed the long run equilibrium level on the upward phase of its 
cyclical trajectory. After this point, countercyclical movement in 
the rates of growth of government demand became the familiar orders of 
the day. A general set of optimal fiscal policy (government expenditure) 
paths is drawn in Figure 5-4. 
GC(t),GK(t) 





Both government demand growth rates always peaked in the same 
period. The variance of G was greater because the price of the capital 
good affected costs, immediately, and because of the more fix-price 
nature of this sector. Our empirical estimates suggested that capital 
goods producers always respond to demand changes with larger output 
adjustments than price adjustments, at least partially because of market 
structure influences. Therefore government demand for the capital good 
must fluctuate more widely to achieve the desired cost effect. Thus 
any time inflation threatened, as during the initial shock or after 
real GNP exceeded its long run equilibrium growth rate (period t in 
Figure 5-4), G was cut sharply to reduce the rate of increase in mar-
ginal cost and thus to dampen the economic downturn soon to follow. 
This explains the severity of the initial induced recession 
in the capital goods sector, and the resulting more rapid growth of 
both government demand for the capital good and in capital good produc-
tion. Once inflationary pressures were under control, growth became 
more desirable. The fact that this basic pattern was followed under 
every set of social priorities lends credence to the popular argument 
that inflation must be manageable before sustained growth is desirable 
or even possible in market economies. 
The results also permit general inferences about the optimal 
interaction of monetary and fiscal policy in response to stagflation 
induced by supply shocks. Basically, their growth rates should move 
in opposite directions until the economy has nearly completed its 
adjustment back to a long run equilibrium state. During the transition, 
i.e., during the stagflation, these policy instruments serve different 
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functions, have fundamentally different impacts on the economy, and 
should not move together as is usually suggested in policy analyses of 
one-sector models. Almost by definition, an input supply shock causes 
excess demand at the old equilibrium prices. This is what leads to the 
inflation. Government demand can reduce inflationary pressures only 
by decreasing. In the case of government demand for capital goods in 
our model, the cut in government spending served to reduce inflationary 
pressures on both the demand and the supply sides. Thus this instrument 
was used more extensively as an optimal response. This result suggests 
that to the extent our model is accurate, real world governments should 
consider cost reducing tax cuts, e.g., employer social security contribu-
tions, in addition to curbing demand in the initial phases of a 
stagflation. 
But recoveries need demand stimuli. Even though our closed 
economy rebounded completely and autonomously due to the implicit 
consumption of the owners of the respective flex-price inputs, the 
optimal growth of government demand during the recovery increased to 
the degree full employment was preferred to zero inflation. 
As discussed above, the optimal monetary growth response moved 
in exactly the opposite direction during the stagflation. After the 
initial injection of funds, designed to preserve as high a level of 
real output as possible given the inflationary shock and the inevitable 
real income transfer, gradually tightening monetary restraint for six 
or seven periods minimized social disutility in every case. This 
monetary slowdown, coupled with the acceleration in the growth of 
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government purchases after the first period, is consistent with the 
argument that monetary expansion is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for real growth. The money stock after the initial monetary 
expansion was more than enough to finance the forthcoming level of 
economic activity, for the nominal interest rate continued to fall 
even after monetary restraint had been in effect for several periods. 
Thus direct demand stimulus, induced by an acceleration of government 
purchases, was the optimal method of speeding a recovery, given that 
finance was available. 
While the general characteristics of optimal stabilization 
policy responses to stagflation that we have inferred did stand out 
in our analysis of a diverse array of social preferences, they are 
directly applicable only to the economy we constructed. Thus future 
research should be directed at making the model more realistic to fully 
test the robustness of our conclusions. An obvious first step would be 
to build in more rigidities that would make the initial inflation 
greater and the stagflation more persistent. A serious omission in this 
and most other macro models is the lack of a service sector. This set 
of industries, increasingly important in the American economy, cannot be 
safely ignored if we wish to understand the transmission of macroeconomic 
effects through heterogeneous microeconomlc markets. In addition, an 
open economy version of the model must be specified before policy inferences 
can claim direct relevance to current problems. Finally, a more complete 
set of policy tools, e.g., tax functions and debt choices inherent in a 
government budget constraint, would provide a fair test of our optimal 
monetary-fiscal interaction hypothesis. 
NOTE 
—Gandolfo (23) provides a number of sufficient stability conditions 
that can be checked without solving the n-th order characteristic 
equation of one's system. The set we used is defined for a 
system of the form Y . » AY + BX + Ct, where a., is the i-jth 
> n 
element of A. Let a =f 0. Form the n sums |S. | • Z |a... |, 
ij J i»l 1J 
j • 1, 2, ..., n. Then a set of sufficient stability conditions is 




SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This thesis was undertaken with the idea that one-sector 
macroeconomic models are inadequate for current policy analysis. Given 
the need to disaggregate, it seemed plausible that the methods of 
industrial organization could contribute to our understanding of the 
behavior of individual sectors in the economy. We have used these 
industrial organization methods and constructed a macro model with a 
profit maximizing supply side. This model is capable of explaining 
stagflation as a response to input supply shocks. 
The dynamic theory of the firm that became the basis for the 
supply side of the macro model analyzed is a theory of price and output 
adjustment. The focus of this theory is the effect of market structure 
on the relative costs of using price or output as the primary disequi-
librium adjustment mechanism. The analytical results derived predicted 
that the larger firms in industries with high marginal collusive profit 
would find the cost of adjusting price an increasing function of market 
concentration or dominance. Consequently, they would tend to prefer 
output adjustments. Our theory also predicted that increased concentra-
tion would lower the relative costs of using output as an adjustment 
mechanism for firms which use excess capacity to deter entry and are 
also subject to internal output adjustment costs. 
The empirical results presented suggested that these market 
structure hypotheses are not inconsistent with observed behavior in 
capital goods industries. We also noted that these observed market 
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structure influences serve to make a sector more Keynesian in the sense 
of responding to demand changes with much larger output adjustments 
than price adjustments. But we found that price was the preferred 
adjustment mechanism of consumption goods industries, and that market 
structure exerted no statistically significant effect on these industries. 
Thus we concluded that it is inappropriate to model all manufacturing 
sectors as fix-price firms. 
The quantitative macro model was subjected to severe input 
supply shocks and responded in a qualitatively similar fashion to the 
American economy in the mid-seventies. Optimal stabilization responses 
to the economy's transition inherent in stagflation were derived for a 
variety of social preference functions. Characteristics of the optimal 
policy rules that were common to all preference functions were described. 
In general, expansionary monetary growth and decreased growth 
of government expenditures were seen to be the best initial response 
to a stagflation-causing input supply shock. The monetary response 
helped maintain production in the economy while financing the real 
income transfer and laying out the funds necessary for recovery. The 
fiscal tightening reduced excess demand inflationary pressures. 
After the initial period, the optimal money and expenditure 
paths reversed their original directions. Since the amount of money in 
the economy after the initial injection was more than sufficient to 
finance the level of activity, gradual monetary restriction until the 
separate variables in our economy approached their steady state rates 
of growth minimized every social disutility function employed. Increased 
government demand was used to stimulate the recovery from its shock-induced 
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trough. By the end of the horizon, counter-cyclical monetary and 
fiscal policy in familiar unison were optimal since our economy had 
passed out of the stagflation phase of its transition to long run 
equilibrium. 
Although the general qualitative implications of our optimal 
policy rules are interesting because they flow from a logically con-
sistent macro model and because they differ from existing stagflation 
policy recommendations, they are not the primary foci of our contribu-
tion. Rather what has been demonstrated is that a disaggregated macro 
model can be constructed from profit maximizing microfoundations, 
and that this model is capable of yielding simultaneously increasing 
inflation and unemployment when subjected to input supply shocks. Thus 
it appears to be an appropriate framework for studying the stabiliza-
tion problems of modern capitalist states. 
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APPENDIX I 
Spence adopts the key assumptions of most limit price models, 
i.e., existing firms can sell their output before entrants sell any-
thing, and they cooperate fully with each other. Thus entrants face 
a residual demand curve, P(k + y), where y is the potential entrants' 
output, and k is the industry's entire capacity in output units. Let 
C(Y) be the entrant's variable cost function, and R the cost of each 
unit of capacity. To forestall entry, the existing firms' profit 
C(Y} 
maximizing k choice must be constrainted by (A) P(K + Y) <_ —^-- + R, 
which guarantees that average revenue for the entrant is less than or 
equal to average cost. Let K be the minimum K that satisfies (A). 
If P(K + Y) is monotonically decreasing and if the capital 
stock is infinitely divisible, then K will satisfy (A) as a strict 
— -1 C(Y) 
equality => K = P ( ) . + R) - Y. Imagine two inverse demand func-
tions, P. and P2, where 
|pji > |p;i 
but 
PX(Y + 0) - P2(Y + 0) . 
Then 
P2(Y + K) < P1(Y + K) V K > 0 . 
Furthermore 
dK 
> 0 . 
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Clearly, for the same Y and R, P2 leads to a lower K, as illustrated 
in Figure 4. 
FIGURE 4 
P2(K + Y) 
P-^K + Y) 
-1 -1' 
If P - P(Q), then Q = P (P), and P measures price respon-
1' 1 
siveness of demand. Since P = -p-, |P2| > |PjJ => P2 exhibits less 
price responsiveness than P.. Since we presume increased concentration 
is a good measure of market power and because a manifestation of increased 
market power is decreased price responsiveness of one's demand curve, we 
may conclude that 3K/3MS < 0 when capacity is used to deter entry. 
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APPENDIX II 
Capacity utilization, Z, is bounded by 0 and 1, thus we add 
the upper bound constraint to the usual Hamiltonian formulation of 
J: H - e"rt[wg(X,ZK) + RI + S(U)] + X(I - <SZK) + 3(U) + u(l - Z). 
Necessary conditions for H to be minimized are: 
(1) | | = e'rt S» + 3 = 0 
(2) || - e"rt R + X = 0 
(3) || - -§ - e"rt wg2K - X5K - u 
(4) H - -A - e"rt wg2Z - XSZ 
(5) y ( l - Z ) ^ 0 , y ^ O . Note the constraint qualification is met since 
1 - Z is linear in Z. 
(1) => (la) 3 = e"rt S', and (lb)3 - re"rt S' - e"rt S"U 
(2) =* (2a) X - -e"rtR, and (2b)X = re"rt R - e"rt R 
Putting (2a) and (2b) -* (4) yields e~rt wg2Z + e~
rtR5Z = e"rtR - re~rtR 
or 
(6) wg2 + R5 -
 R - ^ 
Similarly, (2a), (la), and (lb) ->• (3) yield 
(7> »g2 • M •
 s"° - r s ; + »«r t 
124 
Finally, (6) and (7) together =*> 
(8) wg, + R6 - . R " rR rr - I > 0 V Z, K > 0. 
2 S"U - rS» + y e " K 
And since A. = R when there are no adjustment costs in K, nothing that 
(8) is positive implies that in 
3K/3MS < 0, as was to be shown. 




Jt(Yt'Pt) " -MS j ' ' ' I W V + £) " h ( Y t " ( X t ( P t ) + e))1 
P t Q t 0 
f(e)de + P T f f(c)de 
- b f (X(P. ) + e - Y.)f(e)de - C(Y -Vfc) 
Jy fc-x fc(PJ
 z z z 
t t" t' 
- AQ(Qt;MSt) - A
P(Pt;MSt) + RJ*+1(Y*+1,P*+1) 
where 
•WY?+i'p2+i> • 
Y t+rx t+i<P t+ P t ) -
t+1 t+i t [ ( p ^ + P t ) ( x t + 1 ( P t + P t) + e ) 
" h ( Y * + i " ( x t + i ( p t + V + e » ] f ( £ > d e 




(Xt+1(Pt+Pt) + e - Y*+1)f(e)de 
" C<YtVl " W " A «Qt+2 " «t + V^W 
-A p(P t + 2- (Pt + Pt));Mst+1) 
Note: The formulation of the integral bounds follows the method demon-
strated in Zabel (72). 
We will make extensive use of Leibnitz's Rule: 
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fR(Y) 3f f £ » f(R(Y),Y)R'(Y) - f(S(Y),Y)S'(Y) + j |i (x,y)dx . iL 
3Y 'S(Y) 
Define y E y £ + 1 - x , ^ + P t); recall Y w - Q t + 1 + V ^ and 
Qt+1 ' % + «t • 




-± = -A? + R{(Pt + Pt)(Xfc+1(Pt + Pfc) + Yfc+1 - Xt+1(Pt + P t» 
3Qt 
f(Yt+l ~ Xt+l(Pt + Pt» 
" h(Yt+l " Xt+l(Pt + V + Yt+1 " W P t + V 
" j h ' ( Y t + i " ( xt+i (pt + V + e » f ( e > d e 
09 
- ̂ t + Pt)Yt+l f (Yt+l " Xt+l(Pt + P t » + (Pt + V J f (£>d{ 
' Y 
+ b(xt+i<pt + V + Yt+i - xt+i<pt + pt> - W '
f w 
,00 
+ b f(e)de - C'(Yt+1 - V t + 1) + Aj(Qt+2 - (Qfc + Qt);MSt+1)} = 0 . 
Noting that the second and fifth terms cancel, while the third and 
seventh terms are equal to zero, leaves us with 
-E- - -A?(MS.) + R{- h ' ( Y - s ) f (e )d 
in A C J n 
3J* 
3Q 
- (Pt + pt)Yt+i
 f<Y) + ( pt + V j f ( e ) d e + b ] f ( e ) d e " c ' 
+ A£(MSt+1)} - 0 
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Then if A . » 0 and MS - ̂ r+l* °-t satlsfies 
aj* o - r r 
-ZT " Ai (R - 1) + R[(P^ + P J f (e)de + b f (e)de 
3Qt
 X C C )y )y 
- | h'(Y-e)f(e)dE - (Pt - P t)Y t + 1 f(Y) - C ] - 0 
It is this relation which defines Q* as an implicit function of the 
exogenous parameters, and thus it is this relation which we use for 
comparative dynamics. 
First we note that the second order condition, 
2 
3*\J* 
— ^ = A.. (R-l) + R[-(P + Pt)f (Y) - b f (Y) 
3 Q : 
- h'(Y-Y)f(Y) - h"(Y-e)f(e)de 
- (Pt + Pfc)f(Y) - (Pt + P t)Y t + 1 f'(Y) - C" < 0 




C" _> 0 are sufficient to guarantee _2 < 0, given our previous assumptions. 
3 J* 
Define ŷ r • ~Zn~' ^^en since 





 A U ( R - X ) i M ? + *Z2<*-» + R [ - ( P t + P t ) f < Y ) 3MS 
3Q* 
3Q* fY 3Q* 
-h ' ( Y -Y)f (Y) -ggfj- j h « ( Y - O f ( s ) ^ d e 
3Q* ° - 3Q* 3Q* 
" <Pt
 + V f <Y> 3M? " ( P t + VYt+l f ' ™ 3M? " °" m " ° ' 
3Q{ 
3MS 
(R-l) A 12 3-3; , as reported in the text. 
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In the comparative dynamics which follow, we assume there are exogenous 
3C' 3h' 
elements of C , h', and X .. which change,_and T7T) > ®* TfO" > ®* 
3X. t+1 3Qt 
a(>'x > 0, so that the expression, e.g., -r=7- really means 
3Q, _Jt 3C 
3C' * 3(')' 
30* - 30* 
3C -y u * 3h' 
8 - R C f(e)de 
< 0 ; 
Q 






a Y - (R[(Pt + Pt)f(Y) + b f(Y) + 
3Xt+l t Z 
h"(Y-e)f(e)de 
+ (Pt + Pt)Yt+i
 f(Y)]/-yq} > o 
since h" >_ 0 from the second order condition. 
fY 
Note that since F(Y) = 
3J* 
3J* 
f(e)de, -33-may be rewritten as 
0 3Q„ 
ZT - Aj(R-l) + R[P t + 1f l - F(Y)] + b( l - F(Y)] 
3Q 





Y " { _ R [ P t + l F ' ( Y ) + ° P'(Y) + j h"(Y-e)f(e)de 
+ P t + l Y t + l f , ( Y ) ^ Q } < 0 








- i n < o — > o 











+ ( P t + P t ) Y t + l f , ( Y ) 1 - Y t + l f ( Y ) + 
f(e)de}/ 
"UQ 
Note every term in the numerator is less than or equal to zero except 
oo 3Q* 
f(e)de = probability of a stockout. Thus it is possible that -3- > 0, 
Y 3Pt 
if this probability of a stockout is large enough. 
By similar techniques and assumptions we may find 
3J* 
3P\ 
(R-l)A^ + R[Pt+1 X-.+1 J f(e)de + J (Xt+1 + e)f (e)de 
f h'(Y-« 
J0 
- b [ f(e)de}] - 0 , 
' V 






OJ? U - J J A . fY 
(b) • — - - = - " + * [ ? . . . , f(e>de 
3Pt *t+l
 Z X J0 
rY ( x t + i
 + e ) Yt+i r 
+ ~ ^ 7 f (e)ds + ^ f (e)de 
+ J h'(Y-e)f(e)de - b j f(e)de] - 0 
32J* « „ rY 
= r - ( R - 1 ) A L + R t-<x ;+i>2 p t+i f < Y ) + 2 Xt+i |0
 f < £ > d £ 
Y fY 
f(e)de + X"( h»(Y-e)f(e)de 
0 J0 
.00 .V 
-bj f(e)de) - (X'+1)
2 j h"f(e)de 
t 
fY 
+ Pt+1 X?+l 
- (X^+1)
2b(MS)f(Y)] < 0 if J* is to be maximized with a 
unique P*. 
32J* 






- , p ' 




3?g Xt+1 fo f < e ) d e 
3h' = -u=-
3P* fY 
- { -P^, X".̂  f (Y) + j Y ^ f (e)d£ + ( X ^ + Y)f <Y> 3X t+1 ' t+1 t+1
 s " JQ t+1
 N ' N t+1 
+ Y t + l *M
 + W [ -h" '(e)dE " " f">l"-»; 
3P* 
so -rj > 0. We can rewrite 
3 Xt+l 
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3 J t p rY 
-zr - (R-DAJ + Rf p t+i xt+i F(Y) + J (xt+i + e)f (e)de 
;+i{Ioh,(Y-£ + Yt+1[l - F ( Y ) ] + x:xl | h
,(Y-e)f(e)de 
- b [1 - F( Y ) J } ] - 0 
3P* 
=* 1 7 " R[pt+i xt+i F'(Y) + Yt+i f(Y) " Yt+i F'< Y ) 
fY 
+ x ; + i
{ h" f ( e ) d e + b F » ( Y ) > < 0 
0 
s ince F' (Y) = f (Y) • 
3P* 3P 
Then — = - - ~ > 0 =•*> 
3ir e 9 Y 
3 l Tt+l 
3P* 3P* 3ir® - 3ir* 
< 0 , — 4 > 0 s ince -r^- < 0 , —*%*• > 0 




- a {Xt+l[Pt+l f(Y) + J h" f(£)de + b f(Y)1 
+ f f(e)de}/ 
jY P 
SQ* r 
which, like —z~* c o u l d De positive if f(e)de was large enough. 
3Pt >y 
3P* 3Q* 
Note that -3- is more likely to be positive than -3-, since the numerator 
3Qt 3Pt 
does not contain the negative term -Y .. f(Y). 
APPENDIX IV 
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A. Industries included in the sample 
Consumption 
Women's hosiery, except socks 
Wood household furniture 
Metal household furniture 
Mattresses and bedsprings 
Sanitary paper products 
Women's footwear, except athletic 
Cutlery 
Household cooking equipment 
Household refrigerators and freezers 
Household laundry equipment 
Household vacuum cleaners 
Radio and TV receiving sets 
Primary batteries, dry and wet 
Capital 
Wood office furniture 
Metal office furniture 
Farm machinery and equipment 
Conveyors and conveying equipment 
Industrial trucks and tractors 
Machine tools, metal cutting types 
Machine tools, metal forming types 




Printing trades machinery 
Industrial furnaces and ovens 
Calculating and accounting machines 
Scales and balances, except laboratory 
Automatic merchandising machines 
Transformers 
Truck and bus bodies 
Railroad equipment 
APPENDIX V 
The F-statistic for testing that slopes and intercept of 
pooled data are equal is 
_ m (restricted sum of squared residuals - unrestricted SSR)/(2N-2) 
n 
unrestricted SSR/( Z T.-2N) 
i-l 1 
N = number of industries 
T. * observations on the i-th industry 
n 
I T. = total number of observations 
1=1 x 
If the computed F is significant, we do not pool the data. From an 
F distribution table, F^j 1 2 Q - 1.76. 
The computed F's were: 
C* - .378 
?£ - .0697 
Kt » .577 
P^ - 1.59 
Thus all the computed F's imply that each pooled sample of data is 
consistent with a single underlying population. 
APPENDIX VI 
Variables Used in the Estimation 
Prices—Four digit price indices were taken from the Handbook of 
Labor Statistics selected SIC industries list, or where 
appropriate industry definitions permitted, from the 
WPI/PPI and CPI components' indices. The price change 
dependent variable was Pt+1 - Pfc, the change in the 
price index. All indices were converted to the common 
1967 base year. 
Output—Value of shipments minus the change in inventories during the 
year, all reported in the Annual Surveys and Census of 
Manufactures. An index based on 1967 magnitudes was con-
structed, deflated by current own price to reflect a real 
output index. The change in output dependent variable 
w a s Qt+1 " Q f 
Demand—Index of value of shipments deflated by current own price to 
reflect real demand. 
Inventories—Finished good inventory deflated as above. V • end of 
period t-1 inventory. 
Interest rate—The 4-6 month commercial paper rate, from the Federal 
Reserve Bulletin. The same rate was used for each industry. 
2 
1/Dominance—The inverse of Kwoka's dominance index, D • Z(s. - s..) 
where the s.'s are ranked from largest to smallest. D was 
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constructed according to the algorithm described in (40), 
using 1972 concentration ratio data in the Census of 
Manufactures. Each industry has its own unique index 
that was not varied over time. 
l/cv~The inverse of the coefficient of variation, x/a, was computed 
from the change in demand index for each firm. 
Marginal cost—Based on the assumption of a fixed proportion produc-
tion function, this index was constructed using input infor-
mation in the Census of Manufactures. In general, the index 
was MC - aWt + bp£ + C P ^ + dP
E where 
a « production labor's share of a dollar of value of shipments 
b = purchased materials' share of a dollar of value of shipments 
c = purchased energy's share of a dollar of value of shipments 
and b = 1 - ( a + c + d ) . The industry specific input propor-
tions were assumed to be time invariant, and data for them 
was taken from the 1972 Census of Manufactures. The Census 
and Annual Surveys also provide data to permit construction 
for each industry of wage per production man hour; the 1967 
based index of this became Wfc. The procedure used to construct 
P , P , and P indices was somewhat involved, and can best 
be illustrated by energy. 
E 
P —The 1972 Census lists energy sources and in what proportion they 
are used for each industry. Thus if industry i used 40% 
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electricity and 60% heating oil, PE - .4 p E L E C T* + .6 PH* 0 I L. 
The P~ were obtained from the WPI/PPI components index. 
RM 
P - The 1972 Census lists materials consumed. Cost shares were 
constructed, and these materials prices have categories 
in the WPI/PPI, also. 
V 
P —An industry was defined to be a capital goods industry if at least 
50% of its total output was sold to the GPDI component of 
final demand in the 1967 368-sector input-output table. For 
the construction of the P index, we defined all capital to 
come from these sectors, since these are the only capital 
goods industries with price data available. Weights for a 
given P. are the shares of all of the j-th industry's 
purchases from the i-th capital goods industry. For example, 
if industry 3632 bought 40% of its investment from 3612 and 
60% from 3551, then P* 0 = .4 P?
6 1 2 + .6 P?551. 
JOji. t t 
Marginal revenue—Since MR » P (1 ), and n is unobservable, we 
used P. in the regressions. Thus the observed coefficient 
is actually (1 - 1/n )£. This does not result in regressing 
price on price, since price change was the dependent variable. 
138 
APPENDIX VII 
Our estimated system of equations is of the form 
Yt+1 " Yt * °0 + °1 Xl + a2 X2 + °3(Zt+l " V 
Zt+1 " Zt ' *0 + h h + h X3 + 63<Yt+l " V 
Substitution after estimation yields 




1 - a3 h 
(oQ + a 3 gQ + (c^ + a 3 g ^ + a 2 X2 + (1 - a 3 B3)Yt) 
't+1 i - e3 a3 
(SQ + e3 aQ + (ex + 63 a1)X1 + 83 a2 X2 
+ 32 X3 + (1 - e3 a3)Zt) . 
Then, as we explained in Chapter IV, to approximate adjustment elasticities 
we used, e.g., 
'ZX, 
h + h °1 
i - e3 a3 
_ » 
z 
where X.. and Z are the arithmetic means of the variables in question. 
Knowledge of tehse elasticities allows us to formulate the numerical 
model in terms of rates of change. 
To see the coefficient adjustments that were necessary, note 
that the macro model is of the form YfcJ, • A T + BXto + C„. The A matrix 
t+1 t t t 
determines stability, thus it was here that our modifications had to be 
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made. Table VII-A shows the A matrix coefficients we derived from 
values within 95% confidence intervals of our estimates obtained assum-
ing adaptive expectations. In Table VII-B we present the coefficients 
used that guaranteed stability. All coefficients that differ from 
those derived from our estimates are circled. 
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Table VII-A 
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The complete reduced form model used in the simulations was: 
K .. » .1627 K„ -.99 P* -.157 C„ -.313 P? -.287 Wt 
t+1 t t t t t 
-.0503 r. +.1466 KJ; +.9 P?1 +.04 cj +.019 G? 
C u t . u C 
+.259 G* -.393 P?1 +.2358 RM® -.043 pf 
+.0332 if. -.4166 XK* +.6779 K* +.0503 r* 
t 
p L i " - 0 6 7 K- +-987 P* +.049 C„ -.27 P J +.047 W„ 
t+l t t t t t 
+.021 r. -.1078 KJ; -.04 P?1 +.0025 G° +.034 GK 
+.064 pjp1 -.038 RMf +.007 P? -.0009 if -.0546 XK* 
t t t t 
+.0488 K* -.021 r* 
C*J.I - --056 R\ -.337 P* -.306 PJ -.249 W„ 
t+1 t t t t 
T PT C 
-.0563 r„ +.2457 CI -.019 P ^ +.025 G„ 
t t t t 
-.51 P ^ +.321 RM? -.043 P? +.002 if -.118 XC* 
t t t t 
+.0125 C* +.0563 r* 
P*Li • -0^56 K„ +.126 P* +.071 W«. +.009 r„ +.1 CL t+1 t t t t t 
+.948 P?1 +.02961 GJ +.146 P?1 -.092 RM® 
t t t c 
+.012 P? -.00621 Ef -.141 XC* -.009 r* +.064 C* 
t t 
W^i - -0°8 K +.00432 PK +.0277 C„ +.752 pj -.26 U„ t+1 t t t t t 
+.06 P? -.0357 if +.26 U* 
t t 
r ., - .017 K +.017 P* +.063 C„ +.063 P^ + r.. -.08 M„ 
t+l t t t t t t 
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U ,. - -.2546 K„ -.6954 C.. + \J„ +.95 Nf 











p t+ l = p t ' w h e r e 
K =• the rate of increase of output of the capital good 
P = the rate of increase of the price of the capital good 
C = the rate of increase of output of the consumption good 
Q 
P = the rate of increase of the price of the consumption good 
W = the rate of increase of money wages 
r = the level of the nominal interest rate 
U = the level of the unemployment rate 
Q 
G = the rate of increase of government spending on the consumption good 
,K the rate of increase of government spending on the capital good 
M » the rate of increase of the money supply 
~RM 
P • the rate of Increase of the parity term in the raw material market 
RM = the rate of increase of raw material supply 
P s the rate of increase of the parity term in the energy market 
E * the rate of increase of the energy supply 
N m the rate of increase of the labor force 
K* 
X - the long run equilibrium rate of growth of capital demand 
K* • the long run equilibrium rate of growth of capital output 
r* • the long run equilibrium rate of interest 
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P • the long run equilibrium rate 
c* 
X • the long run equilibrium rate 
C* - the long run equilibrium rate 
c* 
P a the long run equilibrium rate 
U* = the long run equilibrium rate 
of growth of the price of K 
of growth of consumption demand 
of growth of consumption output 
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